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PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON STEPS
TOWARD EQUALITY OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF
CITIZENS
JOEL L. FLEISHMANt
The gradual development of the principle of equality is, therefore,
a providential fact. It has all the chief characteristics of such a fact: it
is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference,
and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress.
Alexis de Tocquevillel
Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined.
Archibald Cox2
Wealth, like race, creed, color, is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process.
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections3
The human personality is defined by infinitely diverse combinations
of traits-some genetically inherited, some freely chosen, and some
environmentally conditioned. In essence, the richly varying patterns,
always life's glory as well as sometimes its dilemma, constitute inequali-
ties. They differentiate human beings one from another, and serve as the
criteria by which we ration the scarce resources of society, choose our
friends, and, indeed, make all social and individual choices, including
the choice in a democracy of those who are to govern. Inevitably, there-
fore, they come to bear in the political process.
Some of the inequalities of politically active men and women are
highly pertinent to their fitness for public office. What could be more
properly the bases for citizen choice than candidates' comparative integ-
rity, honesty, vision, intelligence, courage, charisma, and creativity?
Even if it were thought desirable to limit the differential influence of
tAssociate Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Policy Sciences and Public
Affairs, Duke University. The author acknowledges his special gratitude to Mitchell Sviridoff and
William Grinker of the Ford Foundation, which supported this study, and to Professors Daniel
Pollitt, A. Kenneth Pye. and William Van Alstyne for their most helpful criticisms of this article.
This is one chapter of a book to be published in 1974, dealing broadly with public subsidization of
elections. -0 Joel L. Fleishman 1973. All rights reserved.
11 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 6 (Bradley ed. 1946).
-Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 91 (1966).
'383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (Douglas, J.).
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such characteristics in the political process, it would be impossible to
do so.
There is one inequality, however, that is simultaneously not perti-
nent to a candidate's qualifications to govern and yet most susceptible
to social limitation-the amount of wealth that one commands. To the
extent that this irrelevant inequality is permitted to influence electoral
choice, the democratic quality of the choice is inherently diminished.
When public elections depend entirely on the mobilization of private
wealth, they are vulnerable to the risk that pertinent and proper choice
criteria will be subordinated to the improper influence of wealth.
Enough has already been written elsewhere about how exclusive
reliance on private financing inevitably requires private wealth to play
the leading role in the gate-keeping and handicapping of political cam-
paigns.' The manifold consequences of that reliance-in deterring impe-
cunious but otherwise able candidates from running; in admitting only
those candidates favored by, and presumably favorable to, wealth; in
according differential advantage to those candidates to whom wealth is
most readily available; in skewing post-election policy or official per-
formance in favor of donors-are too well known to require elaboration
here.5 While the philosophical and moral implications of those conse-
quences have been explored elsewhere,6 the possible legal remedies have
not.
During virtually our entire history of attempting to cure the worst
consequences of private financing of elections-now nearly seventy-five
years, we have exclusively employed measures which constrain undesira-
ble characteristics of the campaign process, such as limitations on the
size and source of contributions and on the object and level of expendi-
tures. Unlike many other countries, we have never utilized measures
that support desirable characteristics in election campaigns, such as the
public subsidization of political activity. Nearly all of the attempts to
constrain election activity have been ineffective. This suggests that the
basic method itself may be ill-suited to the task. Methods of election
constraint inherently address symptoms of disorder, rather than the
Wee J. FLEISHMAN, D. DAVIES, G. REICHARDT, R. RICE, & C. SAWYER, PRIVATE MONEY AND
PUBLIC ELECTIONS ch. I (forthcoming 1974) [hereinafter cited as FLEISHMAN].
'ld. ch. 2. See also H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS ch. 9 (1972): L. GIBSON, MONEY AND
SECRECY (1972): A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY chs. 4, 6 (1960), R. MCCARTHY, ELIEC-
TIONS FOR SALE (1972). For a comparative international perspective, see A. HEIDENHEIMER, POLIT-
ICAL CORRUPTION (1970).
'See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, ch. I.
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disorder itself. Only public support of elections-in whole or in
part-seems capable of coming to grips with the underlying problem,
the financing of elections with private money.
The central difficulty of American elections is that there is no
feasible way to finance campaigns solely from small contributions. The
geographical size of constituencies and the costs of reaching voters
through the media preclude any significant reduction in expenditures.
More than half of all campaign contributions at presidential 7 and con-
gressional, levels have usually come from large donors, and nearly all
domestic and foreign efforts to broaden the base of campaign contribu-
tions have failed.' This has forced politicians to rely on large contribu-
tions, and has created significant wealth-based inequalities in the exer-
cise of political influence in American politics.
This article is premised on the desirability of governmental efforts
to equalize citizen political influence in the United States, in the sense
that government should act to ensure that inequalities among citizens
in the amounts of money they command do not affect the extent of their
political influence. If that premise is assumed, an important inquiry is
how it might best be translated into effective public policy. This article
will examine the comparative possibilities and problems of the two
primal modes of effecting legal change-the litigative and the legisla-
tive.
While the raw materials of analysis-Constitution, cases, and stat-
utes-are substantially identical in both modes, the questions to be
asked are quite different. In assessing the litigative possibilities, we
must ask, first, whether courts would find constitutional infirmities
in our system of private financing, and secondly, whether they would
recognize and implement an affirmative obligation to equalize citizen
political influence. The legislative analysis, on the other hand, assumes
congressional enactment of a public subsidy for elections aimed at
equalizing citizen political influence-hardly an unlikely possibility in
view of the number and prominence of proposals at present before
Congress." It then requires an examination of, first, the extent of con-
,Id.
xIn the 1972 elections, 68% of all contributions were in amounts larger than $100. See Common
Cause News Release, Common Cause Releases Study of 1972 Congressional Campaign Finances,
5 (Sept. 13, 1973).
See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, ch. I.
"See. e.g.. S. 2718, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (introducted by Senator Pell); S. 2297, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (introduced by Senators Kennedy and Scott); S. 1954, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973) (introduced by Senators Stevenson and Mathias); S. 1103, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973)
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
gressional authority to enact such legislation, and, secondly, the limita-
tions posed to the congressional exercise of that authority by the equal
protection clause" and the freedoms of speech and political association
guaranteed by the first amendment.' 2
A. Do COURTS HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION To EQUALIZE?
The central question is whether the dependence of political oppor-
tunity on private wealth violates any rights that citizens may have to run
for office, or to vote for, and be represented by, candidates of their
choice. For the purpose of analysis, the issues that must be considered
in answering the question may be subdivided into five topics: (1) Equal
Protection and Federal Action; (2) Constraining Legislation and the
Election Process Itself As Governmental Action; (3) Political Activity
As A "Fundamental Interest"; (4) Wealth as a "Suspect Class"; and
(5) Equality of Citizen Political Influence: Another Chapter?
I. Equal Protection and Federal Action
If the following analysis establishes that the private financing of
elections violates rights protected by the equal protection clause, those
rights would be clearly protected by the fourteenth amendment against
state action, and possibly inaction.
The fourteenth amendment states:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.' 3
That amendment, however, protects citizens' rights against state, not
federal, action.
Does the Constitution contain a ban against denial of equal protec-
tion by federal action? The Supreme Court has consistently answered
the question by finding in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment'4 a ban against denials of equal protection by federal action which
is analogous to the fourteenth amendment ban against denials of equal
(introduced by Senator Hart): H.R. 8401,93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (introduced by Congressman
Smith of Iowa)- H.R. 7612, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (introduced by Congressmen Anderson of
Illinois and Udall); H.R. 10889, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (introduced by Congressman Gunter).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
"2U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
"U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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protection by state action. '5 The case usually quoted with approval is
Bolling v. Sharpe, in which Chief Justice Warren said:
The fifth amendment. . . does not contain an equal protection clause
as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states.
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The
"equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohib-
ited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this
court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.' 6
While this formulation leaves open the question of whether the
same breadth of equal protection is afforded by fifth amendment due
process as by fourteenth amendment equal protection, the Court has
said in every succeeding case in which the issue has been presented
17
almost precisely what it said in applying the principle in Boiling,
namely, that "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government" than on the states. 8
Although the first-quoted Boiling language suggests the contrary,"9 the
consensus seems to be "that the better view of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment may be to assume that its equal protection
facet, applying to the Federal government, is identical to that of the
Fourteenth Amendment applying to the States."2
2. Constraining Legislation and the Election Process ItselfAs Govern-
mental Action
Early cases required a finding of "state action" as a first step in
analyzing whether the equal protection clause (and by analogy, the due
process clause of the fifth amendment) had been violated. While there
is considerable doubt as to the continued need to find "state action' '12
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 393 U.S. 618, 642 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168
(1964). See also Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714,
721 (1963) (dictum).
1"347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
"See cases cited note 15 supra.
"8347 U.S. at 500.
'See text accompanying note 16 supra.
"Hughes, Constitutional Limitations on Territorial Differences in Federal Food Assistance,
4 SUFF. U.L. REv. 742, 750 (1970). See also Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare
Ass.istance. 31 ALBANY L. REV. 210 (1967).
-1As we deal with both federal and state action, we will use "state action" to embrace both.
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in any significant sense before the equal protection guaranty can be
invoked,22 there already exists a variety of legislation regulating cam-
paign financing which might be regarded as fulfilling the "state action"
requirement. This legislation is found in the Federal Election Campaign
Act 2l and in comparable state laws 4 that establish ceilings either on the
amount that donors may contribute to political campaigns or on the
amount that candidates may spend.
These limitations not only restrict contributions and expenditures
in excess of the ceilings, but, by definition, also permit money to be
deployed below the ceilings. Therein lies one possible infirmity. To the
extent that they expressly sanction the use of a certain amount of private
funds in public elections, they may impart to the use of those funds
sufficient governmental character to constitute governmental action.
So far as formal legal requirements are concerned, the opportunity
to run for office cannot be conditioned on any substantial monetary
barrier.2- Can it be conditioned, however, on an implied requirement
that a citizen must have, or have access to, the permitted amount of
funds with which to wage his campaign for office? Is such a condition
unconstitutional despite the fact that it is informal (in the sense that one
is not legally compelled to spend any money at all in order to run) and
only permissive (in the sense that it allows, but does not mandate, other
candidates to spend up to the ceiling in behalf of their candidacy)?"
If a court were willing to augment its scrutiny of the statutes with
judicial notice that, except in extraordinary situations, a candidate can-
not win an election without spending a considerable amount of money,
it might possibly find the requisite governmental action. Since any high
contribution or expenditure ceilings will be out of reach of the poorest
citizens and thus deny them a meaningful chance to run for public office,
2See Lewis. The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Silard, A Consti-
tutional Forecast: The Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 347
(1963).
2Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in seat-
tcred sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.A.). The Act establishes ceilings only on expenditures for media,
not on expenditures as a whole or on campaign contributions. S. 372, amending the Act to establish
contribution ceilings, passed the Senate on July 30, 1973.
2
'For a listing of these provisions, see 1970-1971 THE BOOK OF THE STATEs 44-47 (Council of
State Governments 1970).
-See text accompanying notes 68-76 infra.
"'Senator Sam J. Ervin is an exception in many respects, not the least significant of which is
his ability to run for state wide office, campaigning on $21,000 and making a pro rated return of
the excess. King, That Watergate Senator Down Home in Carolina, N. Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1973,
at 72. col. 7 (late city ed.).
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those ceilings could be construed as governmental action. A court might
very well reason that, by permitting some candidates to spend large
amounts of money which are not available to poorer citizens and candi-
dates, the legislation inevitably violates the equal protection require-
ment.
To counter a finding of state action, one might argue that the
spending of money in elections has always been regarded as more a
private, rather than a public, act and as an appropriate expression of
voter and interest group preferences.2 1 Such differences among citizens'
access to funds, it is argued, were created by private, not governmental,
acts and are outside the scope of governmental equalization.
But while it may be true that the differences themselves are outside
governmental reach, their impact in an election has been considered a
proper subject of regulation by courts and legislators since the beginning
of the century.2t Governments have regulated the sources and amount
of contributions to political campaigns, and have regulated how much
money candidates might spend in seeking particular offices.
Moreover, since Shelley v. Kraemer,2 9 it has been generally under-
stood that "whenever legal consequence is to be given to the activities
of private parties, state action is thought to be present."30 We know
that even governmental inaction in some circumstances where action is
required may constitute a violation of equal protection:
[U]nconstitutional inequities may arise from the impact of a classifica-
tion by government that fails to compensate for significant differences
in classes that are not themselves the direct product of governmental
action-that is, a state can deny equal protection of the laws by treat-
ing unequals equally. There may, in fact, have been no formal govern-
mental classification in the traditional sense at all, but only a toleration
by government of private conduct that has produced the inequality. To
-See, Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitution-
aliio of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REv. 389, 459 (1973).
2'The lirst explicit regulation of campaign financing was the prohibition of corporate contribu-
tions, enacted in 1907. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. In 1910, Congress enacted the
lirst contribution and expenditure law. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822. In 1911, an
expenditure ceiling in nomination and election campaigns was imposed on all congressional candi-
dates. Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25. The disclosure provisions were upheld in Burroughs
and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), but the expenditure and contribution limitations
have never been expressly sustained. There are several early cases, however, explicitly recognizing
the appropriateness of legislation to regulate the use of money in campaigns. See, e.g., Ex parte
Yarbrough, I10 U.S. 651 (1884): Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
21334 U.S. I (1948).
"Developments in the Law Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (1969).
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rectify these denials of equal protection the state may be required, if
one wishes to put it this way, to perform an "affirmative duty."'"
Furthermore, even under a much stricter "governmental action"
requirement than the one thought currently to be in vogue, what could
be more substantial governmental action than that which constitutes the
election process itself-the quintessential democratic process for choos-
ing leaders and laws to govern the people?
It was precisely such a consideration which led the court in Terry
v. Adams 32 to invalidate the Texas white primary. Four members of the
Court said that, "[w]hen a state structures its electoral apparatus in a
form which devolves upon a political organization the uncontested
choice of public officials, that organization itself, in whatever disguise,
takes on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's
safeguards into play. ' 3' Professors Van Alstyne and Karst ask the
pertinent question:
How did the State of Texas "structure" its electoral apparatus? By
doing nothing; by permitting the Jaybirds to run a preprimary election
to determine the candidates the Association would support in the Dem-
ocratic primary which followed. How did this failure to act "devolve"
upon the Jaybirds the choice of officials? There was a fifty-year history
of Jaybird domination of county elections, virtually unopposed by
other candidates. When a private election of this kind was the only one
which counted, then state action was to be found in mere permission
for the election to be held.3Y
Thus, "[w]hile the state did not create the economic inequality, it
cannot treat all persons the same when that economic inequality will,
under the standards set by the state, significantly impair so important
an interest as the indigent's opportunity to vote."35 The fact that the
discrimination is accomplished in a non-mechanical, rather than explic-
itly mechanical way is "arguably more invidious [because] [b]y making
the state's intrusion into the process less visible, pre-election discrimina-
tion may result in an election fair in form though not in substance.""
3'Karst & Horowitz, Reittan v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967
Sup. CT. REv. 39, 58.
-345 U.S. 461 (1953).
1ld. at 484 (Clark J., concurring).
3'VIn Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 23-24 (1961).
'Karst & Horowitz, supra note 31, at 65.
'Recent Cases: Equal Protection of the Laws, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1547. 1554 (1971),
discussig Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F. 2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 909 (1972).
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A plausible case can be made, therefore, that sufficient governmen-
tal action exists to warrant court intervention. But that is only the first
step. Assuming a finding of governmental action, it would still remain
for the Court to choose a standard of scrutiny by which to measure the
discrimination inherent in the action .3 That involves looking first at the
nature of the rights involved and secondly at the character of the dis-
crimination.
3. Political Activity as a "Fundamental Interest."
We have come much further in policy than we have in time since
1944, when the political character of political rights apparently caused
the Court to question whether it could protect against their infringe-
ment.:" Until the Sixties, a long line of case holdings supported the
belief that, absent congressional action, the courts could do little to
remedy equal protection violations of political rights by state govern-
ments.39 Today, however, the presumption is exactly opposite; since
Baker v. Carr,40 there has been no real doubt that the courts may protect
political rights. In first amendment cases, these rights are invariably
given a "preferred position"'" among already preferred rights, and in
equal protection cases they are regarded as "fundamental interests. '4 2
Chapter One: Equal Voting
Baker was only the preface to the evolution of the Court's attitude
3
'See text accompanying notes 214-49 infra. In order to deal more precisely with the
court's likely choice of a particular formulation of the test by which it will determine whether or
not an equal protection violation has occurred, treatment of that matter will be postponed until
the discussion of specific legislative proposals. For the moment, we will assume that strict scrutiny
will be applied.
""Where discrimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection
clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights." Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. I, 11 (1944).
"Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328 (1900); Wil-
liams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. I (1892); Minor v.
Happensett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964),
aI'd per ctriani, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
"369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
The phrase probably entered judicial language in Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942). See also Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment. 65 YALE L.J.
464 (1956).
'Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562 (1964).
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concerning its competence to protect political rights. Gray v. Sanders,3
decided two years later, was the real opening of the first chapter, a
chapter now twelve years long, entitled "Equal Voting." Declaring that
congressional districting was subject to the equal protection guarantee,
the Court worked out the reasoning it would use over and over again
to fill out the chapter:
How then can one person be given twice or 10 times the voting power
of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a
rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the
geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is desig-
nated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal
vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their income,
and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is
required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The concept of "we the people" under the Constitution visual-
izes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet
the basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to every
other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of
several competing candidates, underlines many of our decisions."
Reynolds v. Sims,45 decided the next year, extended the scope of
equal protection to both houses of state legislative bodies. Declaring
that "[faull and effective participation by all citizens in state government
requires .. .that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature,"4 the Court created a new
metaphor, "equally effective voice." That voice, the Court explained,
"can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's
vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise. '47
The policy had been proclaimed; then came its refinement. How
equal was equal to be? In Wesberry v. Sanders," the Court prescribed
that congressional districts be mathematically equal, which it later de-
fined as "precise mathematical equality" in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,9
and Wells v. Rockefeller.'" State legislative bodies, however, are appar-
"372 U.S. 368 (1963).
"hi. at 379-80.
'377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring that both houses be constituted on a population basis).
"It/. at 565.
1;1d. at 555.
'376 U.S. 1 (1964).
"1394 U.S. 526 (1969).
-"394 U.S. 542 (1969).
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ently not to be held to so strict a standard. 5'
In these cases, the Court barred the subtle debasement of the value
of votes cast. In addition, it has also utilized the equal protection clause
since 1965 to strike down a number of direct burdens on the casting of
the vote. Among those invalidated during that period have been state
laws or local ordinances excluding servicemen from voting,52 restricting
the vote in school district elections to owners or lessees of real property
and parents of school children,53 and restricting the vote in bond elec-
tions to those owning real estate.54 For the time being, the Court has
refused to extend its ban on property ownership prerequisites to voting
to include elections in certain special districts,5 5 but the opinions make
clear that the general rule of the other cases is in full effect with respect
to all elections in general governmental units.56
The most well-known of the vote-casting cases were Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,57 which invalidated the poll tax, and Dunn
v. Blunistein," which prohibited residency requirements, apparently in
excess of thirty days, as prerequisites to voting.59 By 1972, the Supreme
Court seemed to be quite clear about the question of burdens on voting.
"In decision after decision," it said in Dunn, "this Court has made clear
that a citizen has a Constitutionally protected right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."6
Thus, what began as a vote became first, in Reynolds, a voice, and then,
in Dunn, a "right to participate on a equal basis" in elections.
5'ln White v. Regester, 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973), a Texas lower house apportionment with a 9.9%
variation between largest and smallest units, and an average deviation of 1.82% from precise
mathematical equality, was sustained. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), a Virginia lower
house apportionment with a 16.4% variation between largest and smallest units, and an average
deviation or 3.89% from precise mathematical equality was similarly sustained.
1-Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 294 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969).
5Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973)
(per curiam); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
Saler sustained limiting the vote for board of directors of a water district to landowners within
the district, and permitted weighting the vote according to acreage owned. Associated involved the
initial vote to create a water district which was similarly limited and weighted.
"Cases cited note 55 supra.
-'383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"405 U.S. 330 (1972).
ISee Woodsum v. Boyd, 341 F. Supp. 448 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973), which sustained a fifty day residency period for voting in Arizona.
1"405 U.S. at 336.
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Chapter Two: Equal Candidacy
Chapter Two began in 1968 with Williams v. Rhodes," a case of
great constitutional importance but widely known chiefly because it
enabled Governor Wallace to gain access to the Ohio presidential elec-
tion ballot despite his failure to meet the procedural and substantive
requirements of that state's complicated election law. The exact ration-
ale of the decision is not entirely clear on first examination, since Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for five members of the Court, utilized both first
amendment and equal protection language in reaching the Court's re-
sult,0 2 as did Mr. Justice Douglas' separate concurring opinion. As
might have been expected, Mr. Justice Harlan continued his erudite and
lonely war against the extension of the equal protection clause to politi-
cal rights.63 Thus, six members of the Court shared the belief that
Ohio's complicated requirements for minor party access to the printed
ballot violated the rights of minor parties to the freedoms of political
association and speech, as well as the right of access to a ballot position
equal to that of major parties.
The Court, however, did not find merely an infringement of the
rights of those citizens who actually undertook the effort to organize
political groups. Going further, it traced those rights back to the right
of voters "to cast their votes effectively,"'" declaring that "the right to
vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two
parties when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot." 5 By
deriving infringement of the candidate's right to equal ballot access
from the voter's right to a wide choice among candidates, the Court
immeasurably strengthened the position of the candidate's right, and
created a formula which has now become standard in all equal political
participation cases, including recent opinions of Chief Justice Burger."
This augmented power of equal protection has already had enormous
consequences in subsequent decisions,"7 and seems likely to hold even
greater promise for the possibility of achieving equality of citizen influ-
ence in all facets of the election process.
--393 U.S. 23 (1968).
' d. at 30-34.
'Id. at 41-48.
"Id. at 30.
'Id. at 31.
"Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
O'See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Gonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189
(S.D. Tex. 1970) (mem.): Stapleton v. City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
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Chapter Three: Financial Barriers to Candidacy
Chapter Three has barely begun. After Williams had pointed the
way, and Jenness v. Fortson"' reinforced the direction, a number of
lower federal courts began striking down property ownership prerequis-
ites to candidacy. 9 At the same time, the constitutionality of the long
utilized candidate filing fees divided still other federal courts.7 " One of
the latter group of cases, Carter v. Dies,7' in which a Texas filing fee
statute was invalidated, gave the Court the opportunity to speak clearly
on state-imposed financial barriers to candidacy. Deciding the case
under the name of Bullock v. Carter,72 a unanimous Court affirmed the
lower court's decision invalidating the filing fee in question. As in
Williams, the Court traced the candidate's burden back to harm to the
voter. Chief Justice Burger, in explaining the use of the strict scrutiny
standards by the Court, used language identical in spirit with Mr. Jus-
tice Black's words in Williams:
The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for office,
rather than voters, and the Court has not heretofore attached such
fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review. However, the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do
not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates
always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.73
The filing fee scheme involved in Bullock was unusual. Its purpose
"403 U.S. 431 (1971). The Court did, however, hold a different Georgia ballot access law to
be constitutional.
cGonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (mem.); Stapleton v. City of
Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
"Upholding the fees were Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (3-judge
court): Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (3-judge court). Wetherington v.
Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (3-judge court). Invalidating the fees were Carter v.
Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (3-judge court); Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179
(S.D. Ala. 1970): Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(3-judge court): Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (3-judge court), appeal
disinissed as moot sub. non. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). See also Avins, The Right
to Hold Public Office and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 18 MERCER L. REV. 367
(1967): Ireland & Ireland, The Political Arena: Revolution in the Barriers to Entry, 1970 LAW &
SOCIAL ORDER 213; Wassenaar, The Emerging Right to Candidacy in State and Local Elections:
Constitutional Protection of the Voter, the Candidate, and the Political Group, 17 WAYNE L. REv.
1543 (1971): Note, The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 MICH. L. REV. 558 (1972);
Note, Equal Protection and Property Qualifications for Office, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 129 (1969).
The latter contains a comprehensive listing of all state qualifying fee requirements.
7'321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (3-judge court).
7405 U.S. 134 (1972) (Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., not participating).
"Id. at 142-43.
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was to pay the cost of conducting party primary elections. The fee was
scaled according to the population embraced within the jurisdiction of
the office being sought, the salary of the office, the length of the term,
and other factors; the amount to be assessed was determined for each
office in each election by the county executive committee of the political
party. While the plaintiff's fee was 1400 dollars to run for the Demo-
cratic nomination for Commissioner of the General Law Office, the fees
that could be assessed in races for other offices ranged as high as 8900
dollars. Clearly this was a filing fee at its worst, and the Court took care
to point out that "nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity
of reasonable candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts." 4
But the Court's language makes clear that the only filing fee it would
deem reasonable would be one which "candidates could be expected to
fulfill from their own resources or at least through modest contribu-
tions."75 In language which could be crucial to a determination of the
constitutionality of election financing, the Court went on to note:
Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and afflu-
ent backers are in every practical sense precluded from seeking the
nomination of their chosen party, no matter how qualified they might
be, and no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support. The
effect of this exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither incidental
nor remote. Not only are voters substantially limited in their choice
of candidates, but also there is the obvious likelihood that this limita-
tion would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the com-
munity, whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required
by the Texas system. To the extent that the system requires candidates
to rely on contributions from voters in order to pay the assessments,
a phenomenon that can hardly be rare in light of the size of the fees,
it tends to deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate
of their choosing .... 76
Will there be a fourth chapter, entitled "Equality of Citizen Politi-
cal Influence?" At present, there are already enough case holdings and
court dicta to justify it. If the prohibitive cost of running an election is
not a sufficient violation of the prospective candidate's personal rights,
it is arguably at least sufficient to deprive those voters who favor him
VIt. at 149.
7"Nd. at 143.
7'hl. at 143-44. See also Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973), sustaining a preliminary
injunction enabling a candidate for U.S. House of Representatives to file for election without
paying a filing fee of $425, 1% of the annual salary.
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of the right to vote for him. Bullock could provide the means of trans-
forming the one-man-one-vote requirement of Gray and Reynolds into
a less euphonic but immeasurably more valuable requirement of one-
citizen-one-influence-unit with respect to public elections. That is the
only way that each citizen's voice can really be made equal to the voices
of every other citizen, and that the non-germane factor of wealth,
stressed in Harper,77 can be eliminated in elections. Until any citizen can
run for office, whether or not he has or can get from private sources
the money to finance a campaign, voters will not have the right, in fact,
to vote for "whomsoever they please."18
4. Wealth As a Suspect Class
The right of impecunious voters to equal electoral participation
with the wealthy includes a corollary right-the right to be free of
wealth-based electoral influence in excess of one-citizen-one-influence-
unit. That right has considerable support in two cases which have not
yet been fully considered.
Equal protection analysis in the Sixties-the so-called "New Equal
Protection"-gave the Court a choice as to the intensity of scrutiny
with which it would examine particular state actions. If the right as-
serted was deemed a "fundamental interest," as voting and candidacy
were, a strict standard of scrutiny would be applied, and the state would
be required to prove a "compelling interest" in order to justify the
restriction." In the absence of such a "fundamental interest," the state
would be required to demonstrate the existence only of "a not irrational
basis" for the law under review.8
Strict scrutiny would also be applied to classifications based on
wealth. Notwithstanding Mr. Justice Harlan's vigorous and scholarly
attempt to prevent the creation of wealth as a "suspect class, ' 81 the
Court, in the landmark case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,82
did just that. In invalidating the poll tax, which had already been re-
pealed by Congress in elections for federal office and by state legisla-
-Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
7;Williaims v. Rhodes., 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
7'See text accompanying notes 214-49 infra.
' Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948): Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs., 330
U.S. 552 (1947).
"'See his dissents in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1966), and in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-632 (1964).
' 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tures in elections in all but four states,83 the Court asserted that "lines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race . . . are
traditionally disfavored."" While Mr. Justice Douglas, in his engagingly
peremptory way, failed to offer any evidence of this tradition, the princi-
ple that wealth is a suspect class appears to have become firmly estab-
lished, at least in political participation cases, and accepted by all mem-
bers of the present Court. 5 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Jus-
tice Burger explained in Bullock v. Carter:
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact
on the exercise of the franchise, and because this impact is related to
the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate, we con-
clude, as in Harper, that the laws must be "closely scrutinized"....11
Relying on these two cases, the argument can be made that forcing
political campaigns to subsist on private funds inherently gives wealthy
citizens vastly greater voice than other citizens in electoral decisions.
The reasoning might be as follows: the opportunity to run for public
office is available only to those who have or can raise sufficient funds
to mount a campaign. A candidate who cannot obtain those funds can-
not run. As a consequence, those without, or without access to, funds
are effectively denied the right to candidacy, and those citizens who
would have voted for the excluded candidates have been denied their
right to an effective vote.
Then, drawing upon Harper to the effect that "wealth, like race,
creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate in the
electoral process,"87 it would be reasonable to decide that wealth is an
inappropriate and impermissible means of determining who shall and
shall not be permitted, in fact if not in law, to run for public office. Next,
relying on the recent holding in Boddie v. Connecticut," it would be
possible to analogize the government's monopoly over elections to its
monopoly over divorce proceedings, which led the Court to invalidate
the use of a fee as a prerequisite to instituting action for divorce."
'Id. at 680.
"IId. at 668.
' For an example of the Court's unwillingness to regard wealth as a suspect class in other
circumstances, see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (finding no equal protection violation
by a California constitutional provision requiring the placement of low income housing projects
to be submitted to community referenda).
"405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
'1383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
"Btt (f United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), which sustained the prerequisite of a fee
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Furthermore, while electoral influence in our democracy will depend on
many different resources, money, which is among the most unequally
distributed resources in any society, is one on which it should not de-
pend. Moreover, by failing to subsidize candidates, thereby forcing elec-
tions to be financed by private funds, the government invidiously dis-
criminates against those who have insufficient funds to back candidates.
Such a default allows superior economic power to dilute the effective-
ness of the votes of the less wealthy. The conclusion could be buttressed
with the observation that wealth-derived campaign influence is much
more antagonistic to equal political participation than poll taxes, prop-
erty qualifications for voting, and large filing fees.
Would the Court reason this way? Predictions are inherently haz-
ardous, but the Bullock Court was not very far away:
[A]t the same time it gives the affluent the power to place on the ballot
their own names or the names of persons they favor. . . . [which] is
endemic to the system. This disparity in voting power based on wealth
cannot be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined seg-
ments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause, and there are doubtless some instances of
candidates representing the views of voters of modest means who are
able to pay the required fee. But we would ignore reality were we not
to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as
well as candidates, according to their economic status."
5. Affirmative Obligation to Achieve Equality of Citizen Electoral
Influence: Another Chapter in Litigative History?
It does not require an especially liberal interpretation of the equal
protection cases, therefore, to read them as implying an obligation on
government to reduce, if not eliminate, the influence of the suspect
category of wealth upon effective participation in the nation's political
life. Nearly all of the major political equal protection cases do require
affirmative state action. Even before some of the recent decisions, Pro-
fessor Archibald Cox made the point emphatically:
[T]he cases require the state to make changes in the status quo-some
alteration of a widespread and long accepted practice, some improve-
ment from the standpoint of human rights. . . . Earlier cases sustain-
ing a constitutional claim were typically mandates directing the gov-
in order to ile for bankruptcy, which was regarded as not being a constitutional right.
1"405 U.S. at 144.
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ernment to refrain from a particular form of regulation. Now the
emphasis is upon measures the states must adopt in carrying on their
activities and steps they must take to offset disabilities not of their
creation .... 91
Furthermore, after hearing the Court's own language above, it is hardly
necessary to add that "the electoral process is ... the single most
appropriate place to begin the construction of affirmative state obliga-
tions to assure equality. '9 2 Especially is that the case where, as in Boddie
v. Connecticut,3 a "fundamental right" is involved-access to public
office-and the government has a "monopoly" over it. In such circum-
stances, as in Terry v. Adams,94 the government has structured its pro-
cess so that wealth is determinative, and it must, therefore, be responsi-
ble for the consequences.
The problem, however, is in the matter of remedy. Unlike all other
equal protection cases, which required affirmative action or restraint of
burdensome conduct, the only conceivable remedies to the inequitable
system of private campaign financing would require a great deal of
money to implement. A court that wished to act would have only two
options. One would be to prohibit the use of all money and things of
value in campaigns, which is unreasonable if not impossible. The other
would be to require that the public subsidize all campaigns, which would
cost several hundred million dollars a year. In the equal protection cases
discussed above, the action mandated by the Court rarely entailed
spending more than marginal amounts of money, since they generally
involved how processes, which were already functioning, should be rede-
signed. The incremental costs of furnishing a record to indigents on
appeal 5 or of providing counsel to a criminal indigent on appeal" are
minimal compared to the projected costs of public subsidy of elections.
Even extending the right to assigned counsel in criminal trials, 7 now
available in all procedings in which a jail sentence is to be imposed,"8
involves an aggregate outlay which is much less than the cost of full
"Cox, supra note 2, at 92-93.
'Karst & Horowitz, supra note 31, at 67.
9401 U.S. 371 (1971) (involving access to the divorce court).
"345 U.S. 461 (1953) (involving election process structured so that "unoficial primary" was
determinative).
" S'ee Grillin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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election subsidy.9 While those cases offer some support for creation of
an affirmative obligation irrespective of great cost, the right to counsel
explicitly appears in the Bill of Rights, and its broadening was achieved
over a span of forty years.'
It is unlikely that the Court would create an affirmative obligation
where the costs of performing it are as substantial as they would be here.
In the only recent case raising a similar equal protection issue, the
question of equalization of school district expenditures, the Court was
unwilling to find an affirmative obligation to equalize, although there
it denied that the inequality was keyed to wealth.'0 '
A second flaw in the outlook is the problem of governmental ac-
tion. Most of the equal protection cases discussed here have dealt with
actively discriminating governmental practices-that is governmental
action, as distinguished from inaction. While all of the arguments made
above are valid, there is a fairly clear line between a formal statutory
prerequisite to the performance of a protected act, and a statute permit-
ting protected activity but limiting the amount of campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures. This is a line which courts would be exceedingly
reluctant to ignore. Most likely, the existence of laws limiting contribu-
tions and expenditures would work against, rather than for, a finding
of constitutional infringement because such laws have always been un-
derstood to constitute efforts to reform the political process. Ameliora-
tive legislation in general bears a burden of equal protection justification
before the courts which is less onerous than that carried by restrictive
legislation.1(2
The case, then, is not terribly persuasive. While the wisdom of such
a course may be clear, there are too many weak links in the legal chain.
For a court to venture unaided by explicit legislation into this particular
political thicket, to invalidate the basic arrangements by which elections
are supported, and to declare that governments have to appropriate vast
sums of money would require a kind of judicial activism which any court
would be likely to shun, and with good reason.
The judicial activism of the Warren Court, which for the first time
'17he annual cost of subsidizing all primary and general elections for President, Vice Presi-
dent, and Congress, assuming four candidates in each major party's primary, a primary in both
parties for every office, and a subsidy level of fifteen cents per person of voting age in the jurisdic-
tion involved, would be $221,000,000. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, ch. 7.
'mPowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
ID'San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
t°2See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See also Cox, supra note 2, at 106-08.
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permitted major judicial interventions into political processes, was
aimed at a critical state of representational disrepair which seemed
hopeless of remedy without Court action. Some legislatures were refus-
ing to perform their decennial congressional redistricting duties at all,
while the plans of others hardly contained models of compact districts
of roughly the same size. The legislatures themselves were badly malap-
portioned, grossly over-representing some citizens at the expense of
others. Most important, in nearly all cases 0 3 there were no available
means of bringing about the desired changes because the interests that
would have their influence diminished by proper congressional district-
ing and legislative apportionment were themselves in control of the
legislatures that were charged with effecting the reforms. It is difficult
to see how the Court could have avoided activism in those circumstan-
ces. 104
Campaign financing is in quite a different state today from that in
which legislative districting was ten years ago. We have already wit-
nessed congressional enactment of major campaign reform legisla-
tion, "' and there are some three to four dozen campaign finance reform
proposals pending in Congress at the present time. If nothing were to
come of these legislative efforts after several years, it is not inconceiva-
ble that courts might bring themselves to act. But it is hard to imagine
that reasonable judges would be willing to rush in where congressmen
are still treading. For if congressmen are not angels, neither are judges
fools.
Most observers of the Court, however, would have predicted, prior
to Baker and Reynolds, that it would not act as it finally did. Hindsight
rationalizes what foresight denied-the seeming inevitability of action
then. It is conceivable that comparable action will occur now, but any
sanguine estimate must be less than hopeful.
The financing of campaigns is every bit as crucial to representa-
tional fairness as congressional districting and legislative apportion-
ment. But this time the burden is squarely on Congress, and the courts
will undoubtedly be noting what is enacted there. Attention must there-
"In some cases, however, there was the possibility of a referendum.
"'Professor Bickel, with characteristic eloquence, argues to the contrary, A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
" Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered
sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.A.); Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. 92-178, tit.
VIII, 85 Stat. 562 (codified in 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (Supp. 1, 1971); the Revenue Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VII, 85 Stat. 560 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., as amended,
(Supp. I, 1971).
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fore be turned to the sources and limits of congressional power to enact
such legislation.
B. THE SOURCES AND SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
I. Sources of Authority Over Congressional Elections
Because the power of Congress is clearest when congressional elec-
tions are involved, it is best to begin there. There are two primary
sources of that power-one explicit and the other general. The explicit
power is contained in article I, section 4, of the Constitution, which
provides as follows:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representati',es, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.'
The rationale for expanding the obvious meaning of this section to
cover any aspect of congressional elections, including voting age, 07 was
first proclaimed in 1884 in Ex parte Yarbrough:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose ex-
ecutive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most numer-
ous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the people
directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this election from
the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a proposition
so startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest considera-
tion.. . . [I]t must have the power to protect the elections on which
its existence depends from violence and corruption. If it has not this
power it is left helpless befoie the two great natural and historical
enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption.,"
Referring to the times, places, and manner clause, the Court has held
elsewhere:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace author-
ity to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as
to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision
of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt prac-
tices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and mak-
ing and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
'
t7Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
'"I , parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-58 (1884).
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requirements as to procedures and safeguards which experience shows
are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.'"
The general power over congressional elections is contained in the
necessary and proper clause."'
Both of these powers are theoretically subject to constraint by other
constitutional provisions. Article I, section 2 defines the electorate for
House members from a given state as the same as that for "the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature,""' and the seventeenth
amendment similarly defines the electorate for Senator." 2 Both of these
provisions imply considerable state power over the definition of the
electorate, but its exercise has been consistently"3 held to be completely
modifiable by congressional action under the times, places, and manner
clause, and the necessary and proper clause. Indeed, the generally ac-
cepted formulation is that of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v.
Classic:
While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress
is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, . . . this
statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the
Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of Art. I,
to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the exer-
cise of its powers to regulate elections under § 4 and its more general
power under Art. I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers.""'
2. Sources of Authority Over Presidential Elections
There is no explicit constitutional source of authority for Congress
to regulate presidential elections. Indeed, the Constitution appears to
leave the matter up to the states. Article II, section 1 provides that:
"Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
"'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
"'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
"-U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
"'From the time of Exparle Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), until the present, the Court has
only once restricted the power of the Congress to regulate congressional elections. In Newberry v.
United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1971), it held that Congress had no power to regulate primary
elections for Congress. Cf. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1916). This decision was
overruled in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). See also two other cases involving
regulation of primaries: Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
"'313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
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"[E]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct," the presidential electors."' In the leading case of
Burroughs and Cannon v. United States,"6 however, the Court con-
strued congressional power to regulate presidential elections to be quite
broad:
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The
importance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to
and effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be
too strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the impro-
per use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a
vital particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly,
possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to
preserve the departments and institutions of the general government
from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by
corruption." 7
The case primarily relied upon as precedent in Burroughs, and from
which the Court quoted two full pages," 8 was Ex parte Yarbrough, 9
which dealt with congressional elections.
This expansive congressional authority over presidential elections
has never been circumscribed by the Court. In the recent, extremely
complex decision in Oregon v. Mitchell,2 1 varying additional sources of
congressional authority over presidential elections were advanced.
There were five separate opinions, none of which was supported by a
majority of justices. Mr. Justice Black found the necessary plenary
authority in article I, section 2,121 augmented by the necessary and pro-
per clause.12 He reasoned that "[since] Congress has ultimate supervi-
sory power over congressional elections, [it] cannot be seriously con-
tended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential
elections. ... . Justices Douglas, Stewart, Blackmun, and the Chief
Justice found no plenary authority over presidential elections, but dis-
covered in the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
" U.S. CONST. art ii, § I.
IG290 U.S. 534 (1934).
"I'd. at 545.
" Id. at 546-47.
1'110 U.S. 651 (1884).
:-400 U.S. 112 (1970).
'U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
"1U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8. cl. 18.
"'400 U.S. at 124.
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ment,' 24 and in that amendment's congressional enforcement powers,'
the necessary authority for sustaining the congressional ban of residency
requirements in presidential elections.' Justices Douglas, Brennan,
White, and Marshall found sufficient congressional authority in section
five of the fourteenth amendment alone.'1 One may hope to be par-
doned for expressing a decided preference for the simple clarity of the
Burroughs 128 statement of the matter.
As with congressional elections, such authority as the states possess
to regulate presidential elections is subject to the equal protection
clause, and the Court will protect against violations on its own mo-
tion,12 as well as sustain congressional action aimed at preventing such
violations. 3 1
3. Sources of Authority Over State and Local Elections
As a general statement, Congress has no plenary power over state
and local elections.' 3' But if a state regulation forbids or requires an
act in connection with an election at which both federal and state or
local officials are to be chosen, Congress may intervene' 32 even if the
allegedly illegal state action was intended primarily to affect the non-
federal election. 3 3
While no general congressional authority over state and local elec-
tions exists, the states cannot regulate those elections in such ways as
to violate the equal protection clause 31 or the privileges and immunities
clause. 3 - The extent of congressional power to enforce the guarantees
of those clauses by utilizing section five of the fourteenth amendment,
however, is unclear. After Katzenbach v. Morgan'36 was decided, it
'
2 Id. at 147-50; 28, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
'15U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
121§ 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 aa-l (1970)).
1'p400 U.S. at 134-44, 236-39.
'!See text accompanying note 117 supra.
"'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
"'Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
111id. See also Blitz v. United .States, 153 U.S. 308, 314 (1894); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214 (1875).
"-Ev parte Yarbrough, I10 U.S. 651, 661 (1884).
"In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
"'Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see City
of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
"
3See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
" 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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would have been safe to say that congressional authority to legislate
pursuant to section five was clearly ample enough to sustain all acts
aimed at remedying equal protection violations, even with respect to
matters explicitly reserved by the Constitution to the states. The Court
stated there that, "[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legisla-
tive power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'' 3 7 The generous Court interpretation of
those and similar enforcement powers in other cases 138 also buttressed
the validity of a broad interpretation. Indeed, distinguished scholars felt
justified in predicting a nearly unlimited scope for congressional amelio-
rative activity:
The Morgan case is soundly rooted in established constitutional princi-
ples, yet it clears the way for a vast expansion of congressional legisla-
tion promoting human rights. . . .For the future the decision logi-
cally permits the generalization that Congress, in the field of state
activities and except as confined by the Bill of Rights, has the power
to enact any law which may be viewed as a measure for correction of
any condition which Congress might believe involves a denial of equal-
ity or other fourteenth amendment rights. 39
Then along came Oregon v. Mitchell4 ' with shifting majorities
coalescing on shared conclusions by divergent rationales. For the pur-
poses of this discussion, the crucial holding, supported by the Chief
Justice and by Associate Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart, and Black-
mun, was that congressional power under section five of the fourteenth
amendment, or any other constitutional authority, was not broad
enough to sustain legislation regulating voting age qualifications in state
1111d. at 651.
"'Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 509 (1968) (utilizing U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 to sustain
the congressional ban of racial discrimination in private housing); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787 (1966) (utilizing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 to sustain a congressional act making it a crime
willfully to subject any inhabitant of any state, under color of law, to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (utilizing U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5 to sustain a congressional
act making it a crime for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (utilizing U.S. CONST. amend. XV. § 2 to sustain
the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (utilizing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5 to sustain an earlier statute analogous to the one sustained in Guest).
"'Cox, supra note 2, at 107.
11400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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and local elections. 4' The opinions simply do not make clear from
where the inadequacy of congressional power stems. Does it stem from
the implied constitutional delegation to the states of the power to fix
voting age qualification,4 2 giving voting age qualifications a special
immunity? Or is Congress without power to intervene under the equal
protection and privileges and immunities clauses in state and local elec-
tions in general? The language in Katzenbach v. Morgan' suggests no
such limitation, and four members of the Oregon Court-Justices
Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall-explicitly so held.'44 Mr. Jus-
tice Black wrote what can only be.described as a very strange opinion.
Where the Constitution reserves to the states power' over the matter
involved, (which he believed to be the case with respect to state and local
elections) he regarded congressional authority under section five 43 to be
limited to matters dealing with racial discrimination, and not to permit
congressional action against all of the other kinds of equal protection
violations that the Court itself has frequently invalidated. But, "on the
other hand, where Congress legislates in a domain not exlusively re-
served by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not
be tied so closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account
of race."'4
Mr. Justice Black was the only member of the Court so to limit
congressional power. Mr. Justice Stewart, in whose opinion the Chief
Justice and Associate Justice Blackmun concurred, did not address the
issue, and Mr. Justice Harlan's views on the general inapplicability of
the fourteenth amendment to political matters have never gained ad-
herents on the Court. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall explicitly
contradicted Mr. Justice Black's interpretation, "' as did Mr. Justice
Douglas:
If racial discrimination were the only concern of the Equal Protection
Clause, then across-the-board voting regulations set by the States
would be of no concern to Congress. But it is much too late in history
to make that claim, as the cases listed in the Appendix to this opinion
show. Moreover, election inequalities created by state laws and based
11idj .
'"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. II, § I; amend XVII.
"'384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
"'400 U.S. at 141, 231.
"'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
"'400 U.S. at 130.
"71d. at 278.
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on factors other than race may violate the Equal Protection Clause,
as we have held over and over again. The reach of § 5 to "enforce"
equal protection by eliminating election inequalities would seem quite
broad. Certainly there is not a word of limitation in § 5 which would
restrict its applicability to matters of race alone.'48
It is paradoxical, to say the least, that the Court now finds itself in
the untenable position of having asserted much greater power over state
and local elections on its own, always resting its opinions on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, than it is willing to
allow Congress to exercise under Section five of that same amendment,
which expressly delegates to Congress the "Power to enforce by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article."''
Two interpretations suggest themselves. First, it may be that the
Court believes either that voting and candidacy in state and local elec-
tions are not within those areas reserved by the Constitution to state
control, or at least that state exercise of the power to regulate elections,
although reserved to the states, is subject to the strict scrutiny test for
equal protection violations. A second interpretation is that the Court
views its own power to invalidate state and local laws that it regards as
violative of the equal protection clause to be somehow greater than
congressional power under the same clause, despite section five's delega-
tion of power to Congress.
It is difficult to square the first interpretation with the explicit
language used by Justices Black and Harlan in Oregon v. Mitchel 59
unless the holding in that case is to be narrowly limited to the establish-
ment only of voting age qualifications. It is even harder to reconcile the
latter interpretation with Mr. Justice Black's own language in Harper,5'
as well as the following language, quoted from Ex parte Virginia52 by
Mr. Justice Black in his Oregon opinion:
"id. at 143-44.
"'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Recall, for example, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
City or Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701
(1969): Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964). These cases dealt with state or local elections, and all rested primarily on the
protection afforded voting rights by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. None
of the cases was decided by a close split, and in every one of them the Court invalidated a provision
dealing with state and local elections.
11400 U.S. at 126, 154.
"'Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (dissenting on the grounds
that Congress did indeed have the power under § 5 to strike down state poll taxes).
12100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
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It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend
to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immuni-
ties guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government shall be
authorized to declare void any action of the State in violation of the
prohibitions. It is the power of Congress that has been enlarged. "
Nor is the second interpretation compatible with the explicit holding in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 54 or with the judicial restraint frequently re-
flected in the opinions of Mr. Justice Powell and the Chief Justice.
A correct reading of the Oregon holding with respect to congres-
sional authority over state and local elections would limit that case to
matters involving voting age qualifications, that being apparently the
only electoral matter explicitly reserved to the states by the Constitu-
tion. This view of Oregon is supported by Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion,
concurred in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun. 5' Their
decision turned on the nature of the group being discriminated
against-in that case eighteen to twenty-one year olds. In their view, the
discrimination was not sufficiently invidious to justify a decision by the
Court either to strike it down or to sustain congressional enactment
overriding state control by fixing a single national voting age limit in
all elections. 5 Further, they went on to add that, generally, "[S]tate
action regulating suffrage is not immune from the impact of the Equal
Protection Clause. 1 57
The exact scope of congressional authority over state and local
elections, then, is not clear; but this construction of Oregon v.
Mitchell,'"8 augmented by the explicit holding in Katzenbach v.
Morgan,' and the language quoted above in Bullock v. Carter' sug-
gests that, at least with respect to power to decrease financial disparities
among candidates in state and local elections, Congress has sufficient
authority.
To construe the law otherwise would be both illogical and contrary
to nearly every other case the Court has decided in recent years. If
Congress were to conclude, therefore, that equal availability of funds for
111400 U.S. at 128.
'See text accompanying noteg 136-39 supra.
'1400 U.S. at 281.
"'Id. at 295-96 (separate opinion).
'171d. at 294 (emphasis added). See Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional
Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 226-39 (1970).
1'-400 U.S. 112 (1970).
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
11-405 U.S. 134 (1972); see text accompanying note 76 supra.
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election campaigns is desirable in order to equalize citizen political
influence, it would seem to have sufficient power under section five of
the fourteenth amendment to extend to state and local elections any
federal subsidy program that it might enact. And that would be the case
whether or not the unequal availability of funds in politics is a violation
of the equal protection clause.' Needless to say, this broad power could
be used only to widen, and never to contract, equality of political oppor-
tunity. '
4. Sources of Congressional Authority Over Particular Kinds of Ac-
tors
From the time of the earliest congressional attempts to regulate
political financing, Congress has augmented its general power over the
election process with an additional power arising not from congressional
capacity to control the elections themselves, but raiher out of congres-
sional authority, derived from various constitutional provisions, over
particular categories of actors or transactions. Thus, in 1907 Congress
prohibited any federally chartered corporation from contributing in any
elections, federal, state, or local, 6 ' and in 1936 forbade political contri-
butions by public utility holding companies, regulated under the inter-
state commerce clause. 4 In 1943, Congress extended the ban on corpo-
rate political contributions to bar contributions by labor unions.6 5 Other
congressional prohibitions against political activity apply to federal
employees,' state and local employees working in programs supported
in whole or in part by federal funds,"6 7 federal office-holders,6 8 and any
political activity occurring on federal premises.'69
5. Scope of Congressional Authority Over All Elections
Aside from first amendment limitation, which will be considered
'"Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966).
'Id. at 657.
"Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
lalEgan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943).
"'Act of June 25, 1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 167.
'United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 3880
(1973): United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Ex parte Curtis. 106 U.S. 371
(1882).
' 
7Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
IUnited States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39 (1908).
"'United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); Brehm v. United States, 196 F.2d 769
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
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later,7 " the power that Congress may exercise pursuant to its authority
is exceedingly broad in scope. With regard to congressional elections,
it has been held to be as wide as Chief Justice Marshall's famous formu-
lation in McCulloch v. Maryland:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the Constitution, are constitutional .... 171
As the Court noted in Classic, this combination of authority over
congressional elections "leaves to the Congress the choice of means by
which its constitutional powers are to be carried into execution."'7"
Whatever the source of congressional authority over presidential
and vice-presidential elections, 73 that scope, too, has been held to be
quite broad.'74
Moreover, Congress enjoys the same breadth of power under the
fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause. 75 Indeed, Katzenbach v.
Morgan7 ' specifically analogizes the scope of congressional fourteenth
amendment power to the scope of power which Congress may exercise
under the necessary and proper clause. Therefore, to the extent that the
tests for equal protection violation are identical, 17  the necessary and
proper clause seems to give Congress additional power under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
Finally, there can be no doubt that this broad scope of congres-
sional power over elections is sufficiently ample to embrace the appro-
17°See text accompanying notes 344-88 infra.
"117 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), quoted in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320
(1941).
"United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941).
17See text accompanying notes 115-30 supra.
"'In Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934), the Court said:
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from
corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily
addressed to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are
really calculated to attain that end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they
conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and
the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.
"'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibi-
tions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws against state denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought
within the domain of congressional power. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880).
"16384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
"7'See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
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priation of funds with which to subsidize campaigns and parties. Con-
gressional authority to tax and spend for the general welfare 78 surely
provides Congress with the power to implement its broad authority over
elections even to the point of paying for them. 7 1
6. Congressional Authority Required By Particular Election Subsidy
Proposals
Nearly all advocates of campaign reform, and virtually every pro-
posal currently under congressional consideration, embrace the estab-
lishment of a strong, independent federal agency to supervise and ad-
minister the election laws. Such proposals obviously raise important
points of congressional authority.
a. Congressional Establishment and Designation of Members of
An Independent Federal Elections Agency
The congressional powers discussed above are certainly adequate
to sustain congressional creation of an independent agency to supervise
and enforce election laws, and to distribute subsidy benefits. A problem
might arise, however, out of any attempt by Congress to specify the
membership of such an agency.
Under article II, section 2, clause 2, the President has power to
nominate, "and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" to
"Appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law . . ." That same provision goes on, however, to
state that, "[B]ut the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
As part of this authority to create new offices and agencies, Con-
gress would seem to have nearly unlimited power over the method of
appointment and the qualifications of prospective appointees. It cer-
tainly has exercised broad power in circumscribing the President's
choice of persons to be nominated to fill particular offices by specifying
the characteristics which they must possess:
'"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
"'Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 359, 411 (1972),
citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
'"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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As incidental to the establishment of an office Congress has also the
power to determine the qualifications of the officers, and in so doing
necessarily limits the range of choice of the appointing power. First
and last, it has laid down a great variety of qualifications, depending
on citizenship, residence, professional attainments, occupational expe-
rience, age, race, property, sound habits, and so on. It has required
that appointees be representatives of a political party, of an industry,
of a geographic region, or of a particular branch of the Government.
It has confined the President's selection to a small number of persons
to be named by others. Indeed, it has contrived at times to designate
a definite eligibility, thereby virtually usurping the appointing power.'8'
In addition, Congress has limited those eligible for appointment to
particular positions to those to be named by others;'82 it has specified
that particular public officers will constitute, or will name those who
constitute, particular boards and commissions;8 3 and it has even named
specified individuals to particular offices. 8 '
These precedents, coupled with the express constitutional power
reserved to Congress by article II, section 2, clause 2,185 seem ample
enough to justify congressional specification of the members of the
agency, even if they are to come only from the ranks of retired federal
appellate judges, as has been suggested.'8
The one major case squarely dealing with the question, Springer v.
Philippine Islands,8 7 construed not a congressional act appointing an
executive officer, but an act of the Philippine legislature. In the opinion
in that case, the Court took care to point out that where the appoint-
ment power is "expressly granted or incidental to its [the legislature's]
powers,"'88 it would be a constitutional exercise of power.'8 9 Myers v.
181E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 501 (1964), cited in Hearings on Various
Measures Relating to Federal Election Reform Before the Subcontm. on Privileges and Elections
and the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 352-53 (1973).
"'E.g., Act of Feb. 23, 1920, ch. 91 § 304, 41 Stat. 456, 470; see dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 274 n.56 (1926).
"'E.g., Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 534, 45 Stat. 1512; Note, Power of Appointment to Public
Office Under the Federal Constitution, 42 HARV. L. REV. 426, 431-43 (1929).
'"E.g., Act of June 24, 1914, ch. 125, 38 Stat. 388: see Note, 42 HARV. L. REV., supra note
183, at 430.
'"See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
"in Stern, A Cure for Political Fund-Raising, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May, 1962, at 63, the
suggestion is made that the Chief Justice make appointments from among the ranks of Federal
Judges.
'7277 U.S. 189 (1928).
AIld. at 202.
"'See also Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
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United States,9 0 which restrained Congress from requiring the Presi-
dent to obtain congressional approval before removing certain postmas-
ters, was serverly limited in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.9'
Both cases dealt with removal, and no case has been found invalidating
a congressional exercise of its power to designate the qualifications of
those to be appointed to an office. In view of the "ultimate supervisory
power over congressional ...and presidential and vice-presidential
elections"'92 possessed by Congress the matter would seem hardly to
bear any doubt.
b. Vesting of Independent Litigative Power in Such An Agency
There are many precedents for congressional grant of independent
power to sue and be sued in civil actions. The Bank of the United States
was given such power in 18 16, and the delegation of power was sustained
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.9 3 Most of the independent
regulatory agencies have such discretionary authority, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission,'94 the Federal Power Commis-
sion,"'9 the Civil Aeronautics Board, 9 ' the National Labor Relations
Board,' 7 and the Federal Trade Commission. 9 In addition, some exec-
utive branch agencies not generally regarded as independent agencies,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency,'99 and the Small Business
Administration 20 have received similar grants of authority. The consti-
tutionality of such delegations has been upheld in Texas Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. ICC.20'
No precedents have been found, however, for granting independent
agencies the power to initiate criminal procedings. 202 But there appears
to be no authority for the proposition that Congress cannot make such
a delegation. In view of Congress' plenary supervisory role over federal
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
"1'295 U.S. 602 (1935).
"2Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970) (Black, J.).
'22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
1'15 U.S.C. .§ 77t(b), 78u(e): 80a-41(e), 80b-9(e) (1970).
1 15 U.S.C. k§ 717s(a), (c) (1970).
'"'49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970).
'29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 56 (1970); see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
" 42 U.S.C. 1857c-8 (1970).
"15 U.S.C. § 687c(a) (1970).
-'162 U.S. 197 (1896).
"See Letter to the Editor, The Washington Post, May 4, 1973.
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elections, 23 and the imperative need to guarantee both actual and pub-
licly perceived neutrality in the administration of the election laws,
congressional removal of criminal enforcement powers over election
laws from the Department of Justice to a neutral or bi-partisan indepen-
dent agency would seem to be constitutional.'" 4 At the very least, an
independent election control agency could clearly be delegated authority
to request from the Chief Judge of the District Court of the District of
Columbia the impaneling of special grand juries, without proceeding
through the Department of Justice.
c. Delegation of Power to Certify Winners in Federal Election
The specificity with which the Constitution details the presidential
election process 0 5 would seem to preclude any agency certification of
winners in presidential elections. The choice is up to the presidential
electors, and there appears to be no way in which they might delegate
that authority.
The situation is different with respect to congressional elections.
While the Constitution provides that "Each House shall be the Judge
of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members""2
there appears to be no reason that each House could not delegate its
power to the independent agency which Congress establishes. If congres-
sional power to delegate legislative power to the executive branch is as
wide as it now appears to be, 20 afortiori Congress can delegate to the
agency it creates and endows with supervisory power over federal elec-
tions the authority to certify winners, especially if each House were to
retain ultimate say over the certification of elections of its own mem-
bers, as it would be required to do under the Constitution."8 Thus, while
a decision of the agency could always be appealed to a particular House,
that would probably rarely occur.
"Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
2"-See Memorandum from the Counsel of the Office of Federal Elections, reprinted in
Hearings on Various Measures Relating to Federal Election Reform Before the Subconun. on
Privileges and Elections and the Comm. on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 351
(1973).
""U.S. CoNsT. art. I1, § I. cl. 3.
"'U.S. CoNsT. art I., § 5.
"'
7See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legisla-
tive Power, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1947).
"'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
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C. EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON ELE-
MENTS OF THE SUBSIDY PLANS
It need hardly be repeated that congressional power to regulate and
finance elections, however derived, must not be exercised in such a way
as to violate rights protected by the Constitution. The primary rights
potentially threatened by subsidy plans are those guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws, dealt with in this section, and those guaranteeing
freedoms of speech and association, dealt with in the next.219
As noted above, 21' the due process clause of the fifth amendment
subjects congressional acts to equal protection review, just as the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth subjects state actions to scrutiny. The
criteria by which federal actions are tested are thought to be the same
as those by which state actions are measured.211
In examining the constitutionality of proposed subsidy legislation
under equal protection analysis, we will be concerned with two primary
problems-eligibility criteria and subsidy distribution-differentials.
The problems exist because of the inherent requirement of deciding,
respectively, who is to receive the subsidy, and how much each is to be
given. The first is pre-eminently a problem for subsidy plans which
include primary elections; the latter arises almost entirely out of the
common-sense need to distinguish between the major and minor parties
in apportioning subsidy proceeds. As eligibility of some connotes ineligi-
bility of others, and as any differential distribution means by definition
that some eligibles will receive more than others, both problems ob-
viously contain serious equal protection hazards. If, for example, the
law were to employ signature petitions as an eligibility-determining
device, or to utilize distribution-differentials based on the numbers of
votes received, the percentages established in both cases would clearly
constitute the kinds of "classifications" which have been traditionally
the subject of equal protection examination. 212 Furthermore, one cannot
avoid testing such benefit conferrals for constitutionality by regarding
them as privileges rather than rights.213
2"See text accompanying notes 344-88 infra.
2tSee text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
2"See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
21See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949);
Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
-
3Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). But cf. United States
Civil Service Comm. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
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1. The Test By Which the Plan Is Likely To Be Measured
The question of the varying measures of strictness with which the
Court scrutinizes equal protection classifications has been mentioned
above. "' It would not be appropriate in an article such as this, in which
the main focus is to apply the test to particular provisions, to examine
in detail the background and application of the varying tests employed
by the Court in such circumstances. The most which can reasonably be
offered here is a distillation of current views on the issue.215
Prior to the Warren Court, the general test applied to classifica-
tions was the so-called "minimum rationality test," defined as determin-
ing whether any set of facts existed which could justify the classification.
As the Court put it in McGowan v. Maryland, "[S]tatutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it." '216 The Warren Court, however, adopted and in-
creasingly utilized a two-tier test, described as the "New Equal Protec-
tion,' 21 7 which retained the minimum-rationality test for all classifica-
tions except those regarded as either impinging on specially preferred
rights or utilizing innately suspect categories. Where it applied the
minimum-rationality test, the Court gave a restrained review, looking
only to see if there were a reasonable relationship between the classifica-
tion and purpose. Where preferred rights or suspect categories were
involved, however, the Court gave an activist or stringent review, requir-
ing the classifications to be imperatively justified by a compelling state
interest. 18
Because the Burger Court's statement of the test is different, it is
uncertain whether it is continuing to utilize the Warren Court's two-tier
test:
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look,
in essence, to three things: the character of the classification iii ques-
tion; the individual interest affected by the classification; and the gov-
2
"See text accompanying note 37 supra.
2 For a full exploration of the tests, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. I (1972).
Developments, 82 HARV. L. REV., supra note 212.
2IG366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).2 1See Developments, 82 HARV. L. REV., supra note 212.
21'"[Iln moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a
constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Shap-
iro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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ernmental interest asserted in support of the classification.2 1 9
Professor Gunther describes this test as the old equal protection with a
new bite,20 a minimum rationality test focused on the means utilized in
order to determine whether the legislative means are appropriate to the
legislative ends, not whether in some hypothetical case they might be.
Some recent cases 2 ' suggest that Professor Gunther is right, and at least
one circuit court has discovered an intermediate equal protection test.222
But Justice Burger's own language in Bullock v. Carter2 3 referred to
applying the "strict standard of review" 24 of Harper, ' 2 and his formula-
tion that it requires both reasonableness and necessity2 26 to justify the
classification certainly sounds like the Warren Court's old two-tier
test.227
In reviewing equal protection questions, regardless of what the test
is called, the Burger Court, in fact, engages in several subsidiary steps.
It examines the purpose of the legislation involved, the permissibility of
the purpose, the reasonableness of the means utilized in the light of its
purpose, and the onerousness of the means chosen in comparison with
other means available .22 And in carrying out that analysis, the Burger
Court clearly utilizes the terminology evolved by the Warren Court, if
not the precise formula. It is therefore necessary to examine those terms
briefly.
"Suspect classifications" have been held to include wealth,229
race, '230 alienage,231 illegitimacy, 2 sex,2 3 and, according to Mr. Jus-
-'Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
(1968).
' See Gunther, supra note 215, at 21.
2'Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 409 U.S. 164 (1972); Chicago Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
mEslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1973), construing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
-405 U.S. 134 (1972).
*-'ld. at 142.
2Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
21'See 405 U.S. at 144.
"See Comment, A Constitutional Retnedy for the High Cost of Broadcast and Newspaper
Advertising in Political Campaigns, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1371, 1381-82 (1972). See also Hughes,
supra note 20, at 751.
22See authorities cited note 212 supra.
22'McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But see James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), discussed note 85 supra.
2Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (constitutionally suspect); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (requiring most rigid scrutiny); in Hirabayashi v. United States,
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tice Harlan, a vigorous and consistent critic of the Warren Court's
formulation, possibly the "criterion of political allegiance. ' 34 Bank-
ruptcy is not a suspect class. 35 "Fundamental interests" have been held
to include the right to vote,26 the right to procreate, 2 3 and the right
to travel interstate,z-s but not the right to education.2 39 The utilization
of a "suspect classification" for any purpose, or the burdening of a
"fundamental interest" by any means, will trigger strict court scrutiny
so as to prevent "invidious discrimination ' 2 ° against rights which are
protected, and will require a "compelling governmental interest"', as
justification if the classification or burden is to stand.
In the context in which we are examining proposed subsidy legisla-
tion, there would be no suspect classification on the basis of wealth,
although present arrangements of campaign financing lend themselves
to easy utilization of wealth as a suspect class in order to invoke strict
scrutiny.2 2 In our present context, however, fundamental interests are
at stake, namely the rights to vote and to have an "equally effective
voice '2 43 in elections. That factor militates strongly in favor of strict
scrutiny of the eligibility criteria and distribution formulas of the sub-
sidy statutes.
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (in most circumstances irrelevant).
2'Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. - (1973); Sugar-
man v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973).
2-Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
2"Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall so held in Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.
Ct. 1764 (1973). and Mr. Justice Stewart implicitly concurred by finding "invidious discrimina-
tion." Associate Justices Powell and Blackmun, along with the Chief Justice, found it unnecessary
and undersirable to create this new "suspect class," although they concurred in finding discrimina-
tion.
vSee Shapiro v. Thompson, 393 U.S. 618, 659-61 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2eUnited States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
3'Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (possible restraints must be "closely
scrutinized and carefully confined"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (any alleged
infringement must be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized"). See also Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (which speaks of the "exacting standard of precision we require
of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise").
2 7Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). But see Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 3471 (1970).
2'Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
2'San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
-"Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
2
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
-
2See text accompanying notes 79-90 supra.
2
"Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
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On the other hand, it must be recalled that the subsidy legislation
is clearly intended to increase equality of voters rather than to diminish
it, a distinction established in Katzenbach v. Morgan:
In deciding that question, the principle that calls for the closest scru-
tiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights. . .is inapplic-
able; for the distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a
limitation on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing bar-
rier to the exercise of the franchise.244
The subsidy proposals do constitute reform measures, "extending
rather than denying a right,' 245 for most citizens, while comparatively
diminishing it for those with wealth. This is their rationale:
If financial barriers to the right to vote are constitutionally forbidden,
there is a legitimate argument that reduction of financial barriers to
the right to influence voters is constitutionally permitted. And if the
Constitution requires that each man's vote count equally, may not that
fact be deemed pertinent in consideration of the validity of measures
intended to reduce inequalities in men's opportunities to affect the
vote?211
Under the formulation of the Warren Court, which decided
Katzenbach, the subsidy proposals would probably be given restrained
review. Furthermore, if Professor Gunther is correct, the evolving equal
protection doctrine in the Burger Court would tend to increase the
likelihood of such restrained review.2 47
The Court is likely to ask something like the following question:
does the evidence so clearly establish that those citizens denied equal
voice in elections by the system of private political financing are so
obviously not disadvantaged thereby that the contrary conclusion of
Congress as expressed in public subsidy legislation must be regarded as
utterly lacking in rational support?
Such a test imposes on the opponents of subsidy legislation a bur-
den which they would find impossible to overcome. It is, however, prem-
ised on the assumption that the congressional purpose is in fact to
211384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966).
2 See Developments, 82 HARV. L. REV., supra note 212, at II 11I.
2 Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 376-77.
2 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); see Gunther, supra note 215, at 21. Contra, Note,
Constitutional Standards for Encouraging Political Contributions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1970),
which fails to consider the impact of Katzenbach v. Morgan and its "reform" legislation distinc-
tion.
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
equalize political opportunity, so stated in the legislation,""5 and not
vitiated by eligibility criteria or distribution formulas which obviously
discriminate against minor parties or dissident political groups. If, as
has been cynically suggested, the latter purposes do motivate major
party election subsidy proposals, 4' and the plans are so designed as to
benefit the major parties unduly in comparison with minor parties, the
Court would undoubtedly and properly invoke strict scrutiny. If the
subsidy plan does not directly serve the central aim of eliminating pri-
vate money in public elections, and instead offers only partial subsidy,
through one or another of the means discussed below, it is conceivable
that the Court might apply strict scrutiny on the theory that the means
chosen were inadequate to achieve the ameliorative purpose.
2. Limits on Eligibility-Determining Devices for Candidates in
Primaries
a. The Goal of Limiting the Number of Candidates
Paradoxically, we are bound to be constrained in achieving our goal
of equality of citizen political influence by the need to discriminate
among those whom we will subsidize. Even without subsidization, no
election system could permit a large number of candidates for every
office because of the inevitable confusion of the voters which would
result. Given the innate tendency of subsidization to encourage and
facilitate candidacies, the Treasury could be bankrupted.
It goes without saying that the mere presence of eligibility criteria,
which exclude some candidates, and distribution formulas, which give
some parties a larger subsidy than others, would not in themselves
trigger strict scrutiny. Any resource distribution other than on a basis
of absolute equality requires some criteria by which allocations are
made. The question here is how reasonable are those criteria in relation-
ship to the purpose of the legislation as a whole.
The Court, on three separate occasions, has recognized the legiti-
macy of this common-sense necessity.5 0 In Bullock v. Carter, the Court
elaborated the rationale for such a goal:
[l]he State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging
-".ee Developments, supra note 212, at 1075.
"See Sterling, Federal Regulation of Political Party Finances: A Study in Public Policy, 19
PUBLIC POLICY 143, 158-60 (1971).
25Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
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of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion and assure that the
winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of
those voting, without the expense and burden of run-off elections.25
If the government, then, has an interest in limiting the number of
candidates, how can it be faulted for limiting the number of recipients
of campaign subsidies? On the other hand, great care must be taken in
formulating the criteria by which frivolous candidates are separated
from non-frivolous ones, lest the burden of proving seriousness fall more
heavily on some than others, thereby constituting an equal protection
violation.
b. Money Payments as Means of Limiting Candidacy and Insuring
Seriousness
The one clear criterion which may not be used to determine serious-
ness is money. Two lower courts have addressed that point explicitly.
In Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson,2 12 the Court noted that,
"while . . it may be true that serious candidates traditionally attract
money for their candidacy, we cannot say as a matter of law that one's
candidacy is not serious or that he does not have the right to run merely
because he does not have or has thus far failed to attract a certain
amount of money." In Thomas v. Mims '5 3 the court observed that
"[tuhe wealth of the individual candidate is too cynical a test to be
applied to the legitimacy of his effort." As we have already seen, that
is the clear implication of Bullock v. Carter, at least with respect to all
but the smallest filing fees.25 1
Direct manifestation of some existing public support for a candi-
dacy is just a clearly a sound criterion as money is a faulty one. The
Court commented on this point in Jenness v. Fortson:
There is surely an important state interest in requiring some prelimi-
nary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the
name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot-the
interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustra-
tion of the democratic process at the general electionY.5
11405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
2'1315 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd on other grounds sub nonm. Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
1'317 F. Supp. 179, 182 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
-1405 U.S. 134 (1972) (Court disallowed $1,000 fee).
-403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
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Indeed, insofar as a money payment can be rationalized as an
eligibility criterion, it is as evidence of underlying public support of
candidacy. If direct evidence of public support is obtainable, however,
it would obviously be more reliable than money as a criterion of serious-
ness, and less susceptible to being used to show support where none or
little exists. Thus, while the purposes of money payments and direct
manifestations of public support are the same-to limit the number of
candidates and to deter frivolous ones-the former favor the rich and
discriminate against the poor, while the latter are most appropriate,
and, indeed, the best availableY.6 It is true that campaigns to obtain the
necessary showings of public support cost money, 57 but the wealth dis-
crimination involved is not of the same order as the exaction of an
equivalent amount of money in the form of a filing fee or security
deposit, because petition signature campaigns do not have to cost
money. They can be organized entirely with volunteers, and have the
additional virtue of encouraging prospective candidate-public interac-
tions even before the campaign.2-8 To the extent that it is desirable to
eliminate any influence that wealth might bring to bear in the election
process, however, it would be possible to prohibit the use of any funds
in circulating the petitions. 5' This would tend to increase citizen partici-
pation in politics, perhaps more than most other election reforms.
Similarly, establishing eligibility by requiring prospective primary
candidates to raise from private sources a fixed amount of money as
evidence of voter support leaves wealthier citizens in the position of
determining who will and will not receive public campaign funds. If the
ceilings on individual contributions were sufficiently low-ten to twenty
dollars-it is conceivable that such a mechanism might be held constitu-
tional. Higher contribution ceilings, however, would permit the
wealthy to control the field of primary candidates and then to enjoy a
free ride at the expense of the taxpayers for the major proportion of
campaign costs themselves.
Requiring a money payment alone, therefore, would be unconstitu-
tional. Quaere a statutory scheme which provided alternative eligibility-
determining mechanisms-either petition signatures or a money pay-
ffd.: see Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political Candidates. 120
U. PA. L. REV. 109. 129-30 (1971).
2'Governor Wallace spent $750,000 in circulating his petitions for access to the California
ballot in 1968. Ireland & Ireland, supra note 70, at 218.
2"See Comment, 120 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 256, at 129.
?"See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, ch. VII.
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ment? While such a plan would permit the less wealthy to utilize peti-
tions, it would also make it easier for the wealth-backed candidates to
qualify than for those without wealth, who would be subjected to the
burden of a petition campaign. Its constitutionality would seem, there-
fore, suspect.
c. Permissible Ranges in Petition Signature Requirements
Petition signatures are already being utilized by nearly all states in
determining which minor parties and independent candidates will be
given a place on the printed ballot. In determining initial access for a
minor party, forty-two states require the signatures of one percent or
fewer of the eligible voters.260 The formulas for retention of a ballot
place depend on performance at the polls and vary quite widely among
the states.2" ' Forty-three utilize petition signatures in qualifying indepen-
dent candidates for the printed ballot. Nineteen use varying percentages
of different bases, and twenty-four use absolute numbers.2 2 The typical
range is from a high of five percent of registered voters263 to a low of
half a percent of the votes cast in the preceding election for some partic-
ular public office. 264 Only two states exceed those requirements-North
Carolina, with twenty-five percent, and Arkansas, with fifteen percent,
of the votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. 265 States grant-
ing ballot access on the basis of an absolute number of signatories
require anywhere from twenty-five thousand signatures in Illinois to
-rSixteen states require 0 to 0.1 per cent, 26 require 0.1 per cent to I per cent, 3 states require
1.1 per cent to 3 per cent, and 4 states require 3.1 per cent to 5 per cent; see Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 47 n.10 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Id. at 33 n.l (opinion of the Court).
211.See Legislative Developments, The Uncertain Impact of Williams v. Rhodes on Qualifying
MinoritY Parties for the Ballot, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 236, 242-44 (1969).
"
2Note, Constitutional Law-Elections-Equal Protection, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 892, 901-
02 (1969).
"Id. at 901-02 n.30.
-'The following states require that petition signatures be obtained in the amount of the
indicated percentage of the specified base for ballot access by an independent: Georgia, 5% of
registered voters; California, 5%, and West Virginia, 1%, of the votes cast in the last general
election: Missouri, 1% of the votes cast in the next general election; North Carolina, 25%, Arkan-
sas. 15%, Kansas, 5%. Massachusetts, 3%, South Dakota, 2%, Arizona, 2%, Maine, 1%, Texas,
1%, and Vermont, 1%, of the votes cast in the last election for governor; Indiana, 0.5% of the votes
cast in the last election for secretary of state; Pennsylvania, 0.5% of the votes cast for any successful
state-wide candidate; Montana, 5%, and Connecticut 0.5%, of the votes cast for the successful
candidate for the same office in the last general election; Nevada, 5%, and Oregon, 3%, of the votes
cast in the last general election for a representative in Congress. Note, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV.,
supra note 262, at 901-02 n.30.
-Ild.
19731
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
twenty-five in Tennessee."
What would be a permissible range for subsidy eligibility? We
know that the Court struck down a fifteen percent third party petition
signature requirement in Williams v. Rhodes"6 7 but only as one of many
restrictive components in a statutory scheme, which, as a whole, was
overly burdensome. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in
Williams, expressed the view that the fifteen percent requirement, "even
when regarded in isolation, must fall, 21 68 and the court seemed to
agree. 219 In Jenness v. Fortson,2 10 the Court sustained a five percent
signature requirement, but again stressed the unrestrictive nature of the
combination of requirements rather than the validity of the five percent
requirement itself.27' The tone of the Court's discussion, however, sug-
gests that a five percent fee is on the high side, and requires a favorable
context in order to be saved. 22 The lower court in Jenness had invalida-
ted the five percent requirement,23 as another lower court later did a
seven percent requirement in Ohio.? All that can be said safely is that
a one percent requirement is certainly acceptable in itself,"' that a three
percent requirement probably is also,276 and that, in an expansive rather
than restrictive election law context, five percent would be, too.2
We have excellent guidelines for determining restrictiveness of the
""The following states require the indicated number of signatures on the petitions for ballot
access by an independent candidate: Illinois, 25,000; North Dakota, 15,000; New York, 12,000;
Mississippi, 10,000. South Carolina, 10,000. Maryland, 5,000; Oklahoma, 5,000; Idaho, 3,000:
Minnesota, 2000, Alaska, 1000; Iowa, 1000; Kentucky, 1000; Nebraska, 1000: New Hampshire,
1000: New Jersey, 800. Rhode Island, 500: Alabama, 300; Colorado, 300; Utah, 500; Virginia, 250;
Wyoming, 100: Hawaii, 25: and Tennessee, 25. Id.
-7393 U.S. 23 (1968).
-'"Id. at 46.
21'd. at 33.
403 U.S. 431 (1971).
1Id. at 438-39.
-72 d.
*"Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970). The court
did uphold a 5% signature requirement.
*Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 318 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1970), appeal dismissed on
other grounds sub. nom. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972) (no mention of
fee requirements made in district court). See also Barnhart v. Mandel, 311 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md.
1970). which construed a Maryland statute with a 3% requirement, but which turned on another
question.
"'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See also State ex rel. Plimmer v. Poston, 58 Ohio
St. 620 (1898).
-'See Note, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV., supra note 262. at 901.
-Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). See also Casper, Williams v. Rhodes and Public
Financing of Political Parties Under the American and German Constitutions, 1969 SUP. CT. REv.
271, 283.
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scheme as a whole, because the Jenness Court was quite explicit. In
referring to opportunities open to other than major party candidates in
Georgia, the Court observed:
They may confine themselves to an appeal for write-in votes. Or they
may seek, over a six months' period, the signatures of 5% of the eligible
electorate for the office in question. If they choose the latter course,
the way is open. For Georgia imposes no suffocating restrictions what-
ever upon the free circulation of nominating petitions. A voter may
sign a petition even though he has signed others, and a voter who has
signed a petition of a non-party candidate is free thereafter to partici-
pate in a party primary. The signer of a petition is not required to state
that he intends to vote for that candidate at the election. A person who
has previously voted in a party primary is fully eligible to sign a
petition, and so, on the other hand, is a person who is not even regis-
tered at the time of previous election. No signature on a nominating
petition need be notarized." 8
This is not to say that any one of these characteristics, standing alone,
would be unconstitutional, or even that a combination of several would
be. Rather it is to note that the more the number of such restrictions in
combination, the more questionable the scheme as a whole. The only
qualification we know to be invalid by itself is a requirement like the
one contained in an Illinois statute, that petition signatories be geo-
graphically distributed among a large number of geographical sub-units
of a state. 279
A geographical distribution requirement for determining minor
party eligibility has been frequently incorporated in subsidy plans for
presidential elections. 28 0 If the plan requires no more than that a minor
party qualify for the ballot in as many states as have sufficient electoral
votes to elect a president, it is tempting to think that it might be accepta-
ble. Such an exception could perhaps be justified by the nature of the
electoral college system of weighted voting by states, and by the appar-
ent reasonableness of giving subsidies only to those candidates who have
a formal, even if not a formidable, chance of winning. The trouble is,
however, that minor parties are frequently confined to single states or
regions, and that, in any event, they will never be able to become na-
27403 U.S. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
""Moore v. Ogilvie. 394 U.S. 814 (1969), overruling MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281
(1948). The Court held unconstitutional an Illinois requirement that petition signatures had to be
spread over 50 counties, with at least 200 per county, overruling an earlier decision in so holding.
2"See. e.g., TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME 22-23 (1969).
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tional without starting in only a few states at a time. Any subsidy plan,
therefore, which defined eligibility on the basis of multiple state baliot
positions would be inherently discriminatory and probably unconstitu-
tional.
At the state level, however, the situation might not be the same.
The flaw in the Illinois plan was in its arbitrary designation of a fixed
number of counties from which signatures had to be obtained, as well
as in its obvious intent to discriminate against Chicago and Cook
County. If a geographical distribution feature required only that a mini-
mum number of signatories be obtained from so many sub-units as
have a majority of citizens eligible to vote in the jurisdiction involved,
its validity would at least'be arguable. The analogy is obviously not per-
fect, however, because unlike the situation in presidential elections,
votes in elections within states can cross geographical boundaries and
be counted. But there is nonetheless something to be said for attempt-
ing to avoid, or at least minimize, the discrimination against rural
candidates that is implicit in plans that depend on signature petitions
to determine eligibility. Population density of cities obviously facili-
tates petition signature gathering, and the low density of rural areas
similarly hinders it. A distribution formula requiring signatures from
no more than the number of counties that have a majority of the voters
in the jurisdiction would therefore seem reasonable.
Because of the need to verify signatures, the eligible pool of signa-
tures would have to be limited to eligible voters. In the majority of states
requiring registration, this requirement would limit possible signers to
those registered. In other states, those eligible to vote according to state
law would be eligible to sign petitions for candidacy. This would seem
permissible in view of the fact that all states currently require that
signatures on petitions be verified by checking to see if all are eligible
to vote. Only three states require that signatures be notarized, and only
three require that each signature be witnessed by the circulator of the
petitionY.28
For the purpose of determining eligibility to receive a considerable
sum of public money, a ban on multiple signing of petitions would seem
to be acceptable, even though when used for ballot placement it might
be regarded unfavorably.
Finally, in order to prevent established patronage organizations
from dominating the petition signature drives, it might be permissible
!"Note, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REv., supra note 262, at 903.
[Vol. 52
CITIZEN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
to prohibit government employees from circulating, and perhaps even
from signing, the petitions.28 2 At the very least, they should be prevented
from coercing signatures. Whatever doubt there was about the constitu-
tionality of such a restriction on the political rights of government
employees was removed by the Court in United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letters Carriers.2 3 If the Court
were willing to circumscribe political expression of government employ-
ees where no specific socially useful purpose was present, it should
certainly be willing to do so where the statutory purpose is to increase
the equality of citizen political influence.
No doubt, the use of ballot-access requirements to determine sub-
sidy eligibility may be questioned. But since the issue to be determined
is the same in both cases-the existence of a base of popular sup-
port-and since both are being used to ration political opportunity, they
are obviously comparable. Whether the difference in function would be
sufficient to cause the Court to apply a more stringent test in assessing
subsidy eligibility thresholds than it would in examining ballot place-
ment prerequisites is debatable. Because the awarding of a subsidy is
both an active governmental intervention into the political process, and
a distribution of public funds to some and not to others, stricter scrutiny
might be warranted. On the other hand, ballot placement is relatively
costless to the state, in contrast with election subsidies, and this factor
could be interpreted to justify a restrained review and even, perhaps,
higher eligibility requirements. In view of the ameliorative nature of the
statute, the latter interpretation seems likely.
d. Security Deposit as Eligibility-Determining Device
The subsidy plan introduced in the United States Senate by Sena-
tor Hart in 197384 uses a security deposit of twenty percent of the value
of the subsidy available to the prospective candidate as the eligibility-
determining device. This deposit, which must be obtained from private
contributors and only in amounts of 250 dollars or less from each, would
be subject to forfeiture if the candidate received fewer than ten percent
of the votes in the primary or general election."' If the candidate wins,
29Cf. Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1972).
-93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
"'S. 1103, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
1Id. k§ 7(a)(I)(B), 12(a).
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the deposit is to be returned to the contributors."' 6
From the foregoing discussion, particularly that involving Bullock
v. Carter," 1 such a provision seems unconstitutional. It is true that such
a deposit is not in any sense a bar to formal candidacy as was the case
in Bullock. The deposit, however, is required as a precondition of receiv-
ing the subsidy, and that is the point at which the basic inequality
emerges. In a scheme in which all candidates are eligible for the subsidy,
the conditioning of eligibility on the payment of a much larger deposit
than was involved in the fee struck down by Bullock, is even more
discriminatory, because the inevitable result is a substantial public sub-
sidy only to the rich or well-connected candidate.
e. Repayment Requirements As Penalties For Low Voter Support
The imposition of the risk of liability to repayment of all or part
of the subsidy for failure to obtain a certain level of votes in the election
involved is another means of eligibility determination utilized by a num-
ber of the subsidy proposals. 8 Such a liability would not be as exclu-
sionary as a security deposit because it would operate only after the fact,
but it would undoubtedly constitute some deterrence to poor candi-
dates. Because of the desirability of screening out frivolous candidates,
and so long as the threshold were not too high, probably not higher than
seven to ten per cent, requiring repayment would seem to be permissible
as the least onerous method of deterrence, 89 especially as it is keyed to
actual performance at the polls.
f Opt-out Provisions As Means of Mitigating Repayment Risk
In order to mitigate the repayment risk imposed on subsidy recipi-
ents, thereby freeing less amply endowed prospective candidates to run,
one plan includes an opt-out mechanism. If exercised before twenty-five
percent of the subsidy entitlement has been drawn, and prior to thirty
days before the election, the recipient could extricate himself from the
'Id. § 7(a)(5) (deposit returned if candidate receives over 10% of votes).
-7405 U.S. 134 (1972).
-See. e.g.. § 7(a)(l)(C) of S. 1103, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., (1973). See also Annot., 32 L. Ed.
2d 936 (1973).
See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), which invalidated a statutory scheme for state
recoupment of counsel fees for indigent defendants on grounds that the statute (lid not give the
same exemptions to counsel fee judgment debtors as were generally available to other judgment
debtors in the state. The implication was, however, that there was nothing objectionable, in princi-
pie, in the repayment requirement.
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race without incurring the obligation to repay more than a fraction of
the amount of the subsidy that he had actually received. Such a provi-
sion would be clearly acceptable, and would help considerably in reduc-
ing the deterrence posed to impecunious prospective candidates by re-
payment provisions.290
g. Subsidy Levels and the Incumbency Advantage
It goes without saying that any scheme which provides campaign
funds to challengers and incumbents at identical levels inherently dis-
criminates against challengers because it fails to take account of the
accumulated political capital in public familiarity and organizational
contacts possessed by incumbents. This problem is not peculiar to public
financing proposals; any provision which holds all candidates to the
same level of campaign expenditures is similarly defective. All that need
be said here is that the lower the subsidy level, the greater the advan-
tage to incumbents and the more likely the scheme as a whole will be
found constitutionally discriminatory.
h. Summary
It is worth repeating again that no single requirement will be deter-
minative of the validity in any plan. As the Court made clear in
Williams 29' and Jenness,292 all of the characteristics of the process have
to be weighed together in order to determine whether the plan discrimi-
nates in favor of some-citizens, while excluding others. It is, as the Court
said, "the laws taken as a whole"293 that count.
3. Limits on Subsidy-Distribution Formulas: The Minor Party
Problem
By far the greatest dilemma posed to subsidy proponents is how to
subsidize the major parties, the candidates of one of which will, in fact,
be elected in virtually every election, without discriminating against the
candidates of minor parties, none of whose candidates is likely to win.
The difficulty appears so great that some scholars express doubt as to
-'0See FLEISHMAN, spra note 4, ch. 7.
-"Williarns v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
-"Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
-1393 U.S. at 34.
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the possibility of devising a constitutionally acceptable formula."' Un-
fortunately, much of the writing on the subject seems motivated more
by anti-subsidy animus than by a desire to clarify the issues in order to
discover an acceptable solution.295 This is all the more regrettable be-
cause the problem is a technical one that is incapable of solution by
polemic.
It is not clear from the one holding in point, Williams v. Rhodes,"'
whether it is only favoritism to two particular political parties that is
forbidden, or also favoritism to a two party system. As justification for
its scheme, Ohio urged the propriety of favoring a two party system
because of its politically stabilizing tendencies. The Court found that the
Ohio system in fact favored not a two party system but the two particu-
lar parties then in existence, and tended overwhelmingly to perpetuate
them. 2 7 It then went on to add that "new parties struggling for their
place must have the time and opportunity to organize in order to meet
reasonable requirements for ballot position, just as the old parties have
had in the past. '2 8 On another occasion, when a different kind of dis-
crimination was involved, the Court made clear the policy reasons for
protecting minor parties:
All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the pro-
grams of our two major parties. History has amply proved the virtue
of political activity by minority, dissident groups, which innumerable
times have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and whose
programs were ultimately accepted . . . . The absence of such voices
would be a symptom of grave illness in our society.299
It would seem, then, that any subsidy plan which excluded minor
parties entirely would be unconstitutional.3 0 That conclusion would
continue to hold even though minor parties had the easiest possible
formal ballot access. Once the government intervenes to affect the out-
come of the election it must do so even-handedly. In this context, how-
ever, even-handedness does not mean giving the same number of subsidy
dollars to the minor parties as are given to the major parties, irrespec-
tive of the disparity in votes at the polls. Presumably, only such a
2'See Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 412.
"See Sterling, supra note 249, at 158-59.
- 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
'
71d. at 32.
-1Id.
-'Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957).
'See Casper, supra note 277, at 284.
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subsidy would be unquestionably equitable, although it would utterly
violate common sense. No court would insist on supporting a group of
citizens who organize themselves into a political party at the same level
as the established parties, irrespective of their comparative likelihood
of attracting votes. In the Jenness30' case, which sustained Georgia's
burdening of smaller parties with a petition signature requirement not
imposed on major parties, the Court noted "that there are obvious
differences in kind between the needs and potentials of a political party
with historically established broad support, on the one hand, and a new
or small political organization on the other. . . ." and that
"[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that
are different as though they were exactly alike.' 32 As the Michigan
Supreme Court had pointed out in another case, "[A] minority cannot
have an equal right to govern .... ,,3"1 Rather, as Professor Rosen-
thal noted, it must be afforded an opportunity to compete, to make its
"appeal of new. . .voices" heard. 4
This suggests, then, that differential distribution of subsidies would
not be unconstitutional in principle, especially in view of the purpose of
the subsidy legislation. Professor Rosenthal has made the point well:
This is not to say that no conceivable program of direct subsidies
giving different amounts to major and minor parties could possibly be
constitutional. There is a strong interest in freeing political campaigns
from dependence upon private contributions which would have to be
balanced against the unequal payments to minor parties. If the latter
were treated generously even though not equally, it might be shown
that they were in fact accorded a better chance to convey their views
to the voters than if all parties were dependent solely on private contri-
butions1 05
How can we determine equitability of distribution? What would be
acceptable as a criterion?
The Court has already pointed the way by observing in Bullock v.
Carter that "the criterion for differing treatment must bear some relev-
ance to the object of the legislation. ' 36 The main objective of subsidy
legislation is to free those who actually have a chance of winning office
'1"Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
"
21d. at 441-42.
"'Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485, 493, 164 N.W.2d 35, 39 (1969).
0"Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
5Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 416.
-405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
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from dependency on private money contributions. Just as resort was
made to manifestations of public support in sorting out the serious from
the frivolous prospective candidates in the first place, it should be per-
fectly appropriate to look to manifestations of public support as an
indicator of likelihood of winning. The fact that a minor party is, in the
end, minor and likely to remain so is a legitimate criterion for differing
treatment, so long as the subsidy enables it to wage a campaign com-
mensurate in size with the demonstrated numbers of its supporters. The
Court implicitly sanctioned such a criteron when it observed in Williams
v. Rhodes that "of course, the number of voters in favor of a party. . .is
relevant in considering whether state laws violate the Equal Protection
Clause." :" 7 Thus, any differential distribution scheme which computes
minor party subsidy entitlement on the basis of its support in either past
or current elections must be presumed to be constitutional in principle.
Critics argue that vote-based differential distribution formulas in-
herently reinforce the political status quo.308 While unquestionably ac-
curate in principle, there would be much less status quo reinforcement
under public subsidization of elections than exists at present under the
system of private financing. Most minor parties can now obtain very
little financial support at all. Any reinforcement tendency could be
further mitigated by leaving minor parties free to raise and spend addi-
tional private money up to the level of public subsidization of major
party candidates, which would place minor parties in a much more
favorable situation than they are now. A differential distribution plan,
then, which favors major parties over minor parties by keying subsidy
entitlement to popular vote attainment would seem to be constitutional
in principle, so long as minor party entitlements are sufficiently ample
to enable their voices to be heard in the political forum, even if greatly
over-shadowed by the actual contenders for office-the major party
giants.
The foregoing discussion suggests that any attempts to discriminate
against minor parties by establishing thresholds for subsidy entitlement,
like the five million vote floor contained in the never-implemented Long
Act of 1966,39 would be unconstitutional. In addition, relying exclu-
sively on a past election for the vote-base would be unconstitutional
since it would deprive minor parties formed since the last election of the
-393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968).
"See Sterling, supra note 249, at 150.
"Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1587.
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chance to qualify for the subsidy.3 0 For this reason, minor party enti-
tlement formulas should utilize both past and present election year
alternatives as vote-bases, with the distribution figured on the higher of
the two.
The crucial determinant of the constitutionality of differential dis-
tribution formulas is obviously the relationship between major and
minor party allocation formulas. If minor party entitlement is deter-
mined by actual votes received, while major party entitlement is a ftinc-
tion of the number of persons of voting age in a particular jurisdiction,
major parties would receive disproportionately more than minor parties.
To insure constitutionality, therefore, the minor party entitlement
should not be computed as a direct function of the number of votes
received by the minor party. It should be calculated instead as a ratio,
in other words as that proportion of the major party entitlement which
the minor party vote bears to the average of the major party votes. Most
of the current proposals, such as the Hart,3 1' Stevenson-Mathias,
312
and Kennedy-Scott1 3 plans, as well as the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act, 314 utilize such a ratio in determining minor party
entitlement.
Such a ratio also insures that if a minor party acquires more and
more votes, its subsidy entitlement will not be markedly less than the
major parties' entitlement at points just below the threshold for qualifi-
cation as a major party. If, for example, "major party" were defined
as one receiving twenty-five percent or more of the votes in the preced-
ing election, and a direct vote-base were used for minor party entitle-
ment, a minor party with twenty-four percent of the vote would receive
considerably less than the major parties. A ratio formula avoids that
discrimination.
The minor party floor is more troublesome than the ceiling. The
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, for example, gives no sub-
sidy at all to minor parties receiving fewer than five percent of the
votes.31 5 Neither do most of the subsidy plans thus far advanced.
3 11
While there is obviously some useful public purpose to be served in
"'Note, 55 IOWA L. REV., supra note 247, at 989.
"S. 1103, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 10(c) (1973) (proportioned to the number of votes received
by the major party with the lowest vote total).
311S. 1954, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 304(b) (1973).
3S. 2297, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 904(a)(2)(A) (1973).
'"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9004(a).
31s1d.
"'See bills cited notes 311l-13. supra.
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avoiding subsidization of fringe groups, the use of such a threshold of
eligibility might be considered by the Court as a discriminatory factor
in assessing the subsidy plan as a whole. Rather than risk jeopardizing
the validity of the plan, it would be preferable to waste that small
amount of public money involved in supporting the Greenback or Prohi-
bition party.
Finally, here as in the case of eligibility criteria, it is the scheme as
a whole that will determine the validity of the plan, and not any particu-
lar component.31 7
4. Tax Subsidies
While tax subsidies are of questionable utility in attracting addi-
tional private money into political campaigns, 318 and are, by definition,
of no use at all in eliminating reliance on private contributions, they
continue to be urged as a primary form of public subsidy 3l9 and have
now finally been enacted.
The Revenue Act of 1971320 enacted both a tax credit 2 ' and a tax
deduction; 311 it also revived the tax check-off enacted in 1966 as part
of the Long Act.3 - A taxpayer can claim a credit of half of the value
of his contribution, up to a maximum credit of twelve dollars and fifty
cents for a single taxpayer and twenty-five dollars for taxpayers filling
joint returns. 324 In the alternative, a taxpayer can claim a deduction of
half of the value of his contribution, up to a maximum deduction of
twenty-five dollars for a single taxpayer, and fifty dollars for taxpayers
filing joint returns. 325 The check-off provision enables a taxpayer to
designate one dollar of his tax liability, or in the case of taxpayers filing
joint returns two dollars of their tax liability, for payment into the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund.36
The problems involved in defining eligibility for payment from the
3lUenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
"'See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, ch. 7.
"'COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV., FINANCING A BETTER ELECTION SYSTEM (1968).
" "Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 560 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., as amended,
(Supp. 1, 1971)).
""INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 41, 642.
"1ld.§§ 218,642.
'Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1587 (now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6096).
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 41.
"-'Id. § 218.
"'Id. § 6096.
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Presidential Election Campaign Fund, and determining the amount to
which major and minor parties are respectively entitled, have already
been discussed above.32 7 Here the concern is instead with whether con-
gressional use of the tax subsidy itself can be questioned on equal pro-
tection grounds. There are two separate questions involved. First, is the
giving of favorable tax consequences to private political donations such
governmental action as to subject it to equal protection scrutiny? Sec-
ond, is there such discrimination among taxpayers involved in the tax
deduction, credit, or check-off as would violate the equal protection
requirement embraced within the fifth amendment due process clause?
The first question can be dealt with summarily. Of late, courts have
been willing more and more to examine whether the granting of tax
exemption constitutes sufficient governmental action to be subject to
scrutiny for constitutional infirmity." Tax subsidies, therefore, appear
to be losing whatever immunity from court scrutiny they formerly en-
joyed, and in this respect are regarded increasingly as more akin to
direct appropriations." 9 There is no question that, in principle, tax
subsidies are reviewable.
The more difficult question is the second. In all the cases exam-
ined, 330 the subsidy was attacked on the basis that some policy of the
exempt organization-usually exclusion on the basis of race3 1 or
sex:34-violated equal protection guarantees, or that the granting of
the exemption to particular organizations violated a constitutional pro-
';See, text accompanying notes 250-317 supra.
2See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), (federal tax exemption to a
fraternal organization which barred non-whites from membership was sufficient governmental
involvement to constitute governmental action under the fifth amendment due process clause);
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge court) (holding similarly with respect
to racially discriminatory private schools, both as to tax exemption and as to tax deductibility of
contributions). Contra, McCoy v. Schultz, 73-1 U.S. TAX CAs. 9233 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 1973),
which held that exclusion from membership in a private club on the basis of sex did not constitute
governmental action with respect to a tax-exempt foundation operated by the private club, where
the complainant claimed exclusion from the club on the basis of sex excluded her from participating
in the administration of the foundation. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York,
397 U.S. 664 (1970), which held that the granting of tax exemption to a church did not constitute
such governmental action as to violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. No equal
protection question was there involved.
'For a discussion of the general advantages of direct appropriations over tax subsidies, See
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1970).
3"See cases cited note 328 supra.
"'McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge court).
'''McCoy v. Schultz, 73-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 9233 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 1973).
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hibition against federal support of such organizations. '" In no case
has the differential availability of the tax subsidy among taxpayers been
the basis of constitutional attack, but the facts and language of the
pertinent cases do not rule out a challenge on such a ground. If there is
any equal protection flaw in tax subsidies for political contributions, it
must lie in their differential availability among taxpayers, for the
breadth of definition of those political actors and organizations eligible
to receive deductible or creditable contributions 3"' would seem to rule
out, except on first amendment grounds which are considered beloW3v'
any constitutional questions about the recipient organizations.
But what of differential availability? Do the unequal availability
and unequal benefits of the existing tax subsidies violate equal protec-
tion guarantees?
A good argument can be made that they do. Any tax deduction can
benefit only those taxpayers who itemize deductions, and fifty-two per-
cent of the taxpayers do not, choosing instead the standard deduc-
tions. 13 For those taxpayers, therefore, the political contribution de-
duction provides no tax savings and no incentive to contribute. Further-
more, the tax benefits received by those who do itemize their deductions
will be valuable in proportion to the size of their income, since income
level determines tax bracket rates. In other words, under the present
law, a contribution costs a poor taxpayer more in real income than it
does a wealthy taxpayer. For these reasons, tax deductibility has long
been disfavored by reformers, and alone would certainly be questionable
constitutionally.337
As we have noted, however, current federal law permits a tax credit
as an alternative to the deduction. A tax credit does not inherently
discriminate either in its availability, since it can be claimed by taxpay-
ers whether they itemize deductions or not, or in the cash value of its
benefits, since it reduces all taxpayer's tax liability, dollar for dollar.
Credits do not, however, benefit those citizens who pay no taxes at all,
mThis was unsuccessfully argued in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397
U.S. 664 (1970).
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 41(c).
3See text accompanying notes 344-88 infra.
:'INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCONIE-1970: INDIVIDUAL INCOhlE TAX
RETURNS, at 103, Table 2c and Chart 2B. 28.3% (20,905,272) took the standard minimum deduc-
tion, while 23.7% (17,527,129) took the ten percent standard deduction. 48% (35.430,047) itemized
deductions.
"'Goldman, Income Tax Incentives for Political Contributions: A Sttdiy of the 1963
Proposals, II U.C.L.A. L. REV. 212 (1964).
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so that, for them, there would be neither incentive to contribute nor
means of partially recouping through taxes any funds which they did
contribute. The approximately twenty percent 338 of the people who pay
no income taxes at all, therefore, would be denied any publicly-
subsidized financial voice in choosing and supporting candidates to rep-
resent them. In view of the fundamental nature of political rights, and
the inherently suspect nature of any wealth classification, it is difficult
to see how Chief Justice Burger could reconcile the discrimination in-
volved in political tax incentives with the concern that he expressed in
Bullock for the political rights of poor people.39 It must be remem-
bered that, to the extent that they result in cash benefits to citizens, tax
incentives constitute nothing more nor less than the equivalent of posi-
tive appropriations, 30 and, as we have already seen,341 there can be no
doubt about the unconstitutionality of using money payments alone as
a criterion of eligibility to receive a campaign subsidy.
The tax check-off is quite different from other tax subsidies, be-
cause it funnels money through the Treasury to campaigns, without any
designation of the ultimate recipient, in contrast with tax deductions or
credits, which involve citizen giving directly to candidates. It does not
constitute, therefore, a citizen-mediated choice as the determinant of
public subsidy recipients. In that respect, the tax check-off is really only
a variety of direct appropriation rather than a tax incentive.
5. Matching Grants
Provisions in proposed legislation, such as that in the Udall-
Anderson plan,:3 which would match a certain percentage of each
private political contribution with federally appropriated funds, would
seem to be subject to the same defects as tax subsidies. By giving public
funds only to those candidates who can raise private funds, the matching
grant plan essentially relies on the choice of private citizens to determine
the recipients of public subsidy funds. Whatever the virtue of such a
mechanism in avoiding the difficult eligibility-determining and subsidy-
distributing problems, its vice is to rely on a wealth criterion in order
to determine eligibility. It is little different, in principle, from high filing
... INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 336, at 4, Table IC. The total number of non-
taxable returns in 1970 was 14,962,460.
"Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-45 (1972).
See Surrey, supra note 329.
3IISee text accompanying notes 252-59 supra. But see Rosenthal, supra note 179, at 417.
31H.R. 7612, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
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fees, security deposits, and tax subsidies in its violation of the political
rights of poor people. It gives to those who have, and denies to those
who have not. Under Bullock v. Carter,:"' such plans would seem
unconstitutional.
D. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON ELEMENTS OF SUBSIDY PLANS
The potential threat posed by plans for subsidization of elections
to first amendment freedoms of speech and association is so clear as not
to warrant elaboration. Whenever government touches in any way the
process of its own selection, it inevitably impinges on first amendment
rights. Indeed, Alexander Meiklejohn, perhaps the most devoted and
perceptive of first amendment scholars, regarded that amendment as
protecting primarily the bundle of rights required for self-
government.3 4
Since these matters have been examined at great length else-
where,315 ordinarily there would be no point in repeating the discussion
here. The focus of the earlier inquiry was limited, however, to the consti-
tutionality of the disclosure and media expenditure limitation provisions
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,111 while the focus of this
articleis public subsidy of elections. The case precedents are the same,
as are most of the constitutional issues and pertinent political and eco-
nomic facts. But there are significant differences between the two sub-
jects, which warrant some consideration here.
The two matters are quite different. Subsidy is a mode of govern-
mental support of political costs, while contribution and expenditure
limitations and disclosure are modes of government constraint of politi-
cal activity. Furthermore, as noted above,347 expenditure limitations,
standing alone, are inherently suspect under equal protection theory as
well as under first amendment free speech and association. Public sub-
sidy, as suggested elsewhere, 4 introduces an entirely new dimension,
perhaps even a redeeming grace, yet it requires some consideration of
first amendment problems. This treatment will necessarily build on the
"405 U.S. 134 (1972).
3
"Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 256.
315Fleishman, supra note 27. See also Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First
Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 900 (1971): Rosenthal, supra note 179; Note, Free Speech Inmpli-
cations of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. Lin. L. REV. 214 (1972).
3SPub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.A.),
"See text accompanying notes 21-37, supra.
"'See Fleishman, supra note 27, at 479-83.
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earlier analysis, and will not repeat the sources previously cited.349
It should be noted at this point that, while the ameliorative statute
exception is likely to lead to a restrained equal protection review, there
is no such doctrine in first amendment analysis.350 If rights are found
burdened as they surely are by some features of the subsidy plans, the
only way to save the plan is by proving an overriding governmental
interest to balance against the infringement. Thus, in examining the
questions, we will assume the existence and presumptively protected
nature of the basic rights involved, 351 then look briefly at the potentially
infringing elements of the subsidy plans, and finally weigh the govern-
mental interest asserted to justify the infringement.
I. Subsidy Plan Infringements on First Amendment Freedom
Nearly every component of the subsidy plan harbors a potential
violation of the first amendment.
First, there is the act of intervening itself-the granting of the
subsidy. Because of the "preferred position" 352 of the rights involved,
courts will undoubtedly scrutinize painstakingly the subsidy eligibility-
determining mechanism and the differential distribution formulas to be
certain that no one's freedom of speech or association is unduly bur-
dened.: '3
Second, to the extent that subsidy plans include a ban on private
money contributions to political candidates, they clearly restrain citi-
zens from expressing their political preferences by means of dollars.
Professor Ralph Winter put this point well:
A limit on the amount an individual may contribute to a political
campaign is a limit on the amount of political activity in which he may
engage. A limit on what a candidate may spend is a limit on his
political speech as well as on the political speech of those who can no
longer effectively contribute money to his campaign. In all of the
debates surrounding the First Amendment, one point is agreed upon
by everyone; no matter what else the rights of free speech and associa-
tion do they protect explicit political activity. But limitations on cam-
31DId.
"1See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 93-94 n.34 (1969).
r"See Fleishman, supra note 27, at 408-09.
2Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
"Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), especially
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion.
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paign spending and contributing expressly set a maximum on the polit-
ical activity in which persons may engage.3 4
There has been a ban on corporate contributions to federal campaigns
since 1907, s5 and one on labor contributions since 1943,: '  but in no
case has the Court confronted squarely the constitutional issues implicit
in placing a ban on the use of private money in politics. In United States
v. UA W,3'7 and United States v. CIO,35 it brushed them lightly, de-
lighted to be able to avoid deciding the controversial issue."' Despite
the existence since 1940 of a limitation on the amount an individual
could legally contribute to federal campaigns, 30 and the existence since
1971 of a ceiling on the amount which a candidate or a candidate's close
family could contribute to his campaign,"' the Court has never had
occasion to weigh the first amendment consequences of the limitations.
The only outright bans, however, have been those on labor unions and
corporations, which would seem to pose less serious first amendment
problems than the ones now proposed, which would apply to individuals
directly, rather than to organizations.
Unless some over-riding public interest can be found, then, the
constitutionality of such bans is doubtful.31
Third, most of the subsidy plans impose expenditure limitations on
candidates on the well-considered assumption that, without any limita-
tions, the subsidy would raise spending levels even further, rather than
substitute public for private funds while retaining the present level of
expenditure. That seems to have been what occurred when Germany
tried subsidies without expenditure limitations. 33 But while there are
"'Winter, Money. Politics and the First Amendment, in CAMPAIGN FINANCES 60 (American
Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research 1971). See also Winter, CAMPAIGN FINANCING &
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1973).
a A'ct of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864-65.
"'Act of June 25, 1943, ch. 144, 9, 57 Stat. 167.
-7352 U.S. 567 (1957).
-335 U.S. 106 (1948).
2'The labor contribution-expenditures ban was first effectively avoided by defining "volun-
tary contributions" expansively in Railway Clerks Union v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963): Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 746 (1961); Railway Employers Dep't v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225 (1956). The expansive definition was then incorporated by explicit statutory provision
into the Federal Election Campaign Act.
"°Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640 § 13, 54 Stat. 770 codified, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 608
(1970).
"Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203, 86 Stat. 3 (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 608 (Supp. 1973)).
=
2See Redish, supra note 345.
1See Casper, supra note 277.
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serious doubts concerning the first amendment constitutionality of ex-
penditure limitations,3t the scholarly consensus seems to support their
validity on the grounds of the over-riding public interest in keeping
election costs down.3 6
5
Fourth, the bane of any kind of campaign expenditure limitations
is the political actor not under the actual or presumptive control of
candidates. It is common practice in American political campaigns for
individuals, and sometimes committees, acting in a bona fide indepen-
dent fashion, to express their support of political candidates, and even
to declare their support in newspaper advertisement and leaflets. There
are also anti-candidate committees, sometimes hand-in-glove with the
candidate benefiting from the attacks on his opponent, but sometimes
quite clearly genuinely independent. Finally, there are the issue-
committees, which campaign for or against a particular candidate pri-
marily because of his stand on an issue about which they care deeplyY.
3 1
In order for a ban on private money or a limitation on expenditures to
be effective, these activities will have to be either suppressed, regulated,
or subject to registration. Any of those three strategies clearly collides
in some measure with the first amendment shield.
Fifth, to the extent that either an expenditure limitation or a total
ban on private money is imposed as part of a subsidy plan covering
primaries, it will have to prohibit committees formed to "draft" an
individual to run.:367 In the absence of such a prohibition, prospective
candidates' friends could easily evade the limitations governing the di-
rect activities of the candidates themselves.
Finally, some of the subsidy plans require that the subsidy funds
be kept on deposit in a federal election agency, with the agency expend-
ing the funds directly to campaign employees and providers of goods
and services, on the basis of certified invoices. At least one subsidy
"'See articles cited supra note 345; Ferman, Congressional Regulation of Campaign Spend-
ing: An Expansion or Contraction of the First Amendment? 22 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1972).
:"Rosenthal, supra note 179 at 423; A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 66 (1971) (statement of Professor Bickel) id. at 75
(statement of Professor Freund).
:'See, e.g., Franklin, Gun Lobby Hails Tydings Defeat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1970, at 35,
col. I (late city ed.).
3"See Alexander & Myers, A Financial Landslide for G.O.P., FORTUNE, Mar. 1970, at 187
for a description of Stewart Mott's advertisement campaign urging Nelson Rockefeller to seek the
Republican presidential nomination on an anti-war slate. See also Ervin v. Capitol Weekly Post,
Inc., 97 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1957), for an example of a gubernatorial draft effort in behalf of Fuller
Warren in Florida.
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plan:"8 would require all money expended in federal elections by any
political actors-issue committees, anti-candidate committees, bona
fide independent actors, as well as minor party candidates, who would
remain free to raise and spend private funds-to deposit all contribu-
tions with, and to make all expenditures through, the federal election
agency. While such requirements obviously lessen the extent of privacy
accorded to these transactions, they differ from present disclosure re-
quirements only in degree and not in kind, and seem perfectly accept-
able.
In summary, the subsidy plans have three primary kinds of impact
on first amendment rights. They necessarily regulate the activities of
candidates and those under their direct control. They necessarily regu-
late the activities of supporters of candidates-those committed to par-
ticular candidates. Finally, they necessarily regulate third party political
actors-those primarily committed not to a particular candidate in him-
self, but to their conception of the public interest or their private inter-
est, and who attempt to serve that interest by working for or against a
particular candidate. It is hard to conceive of any pattern of regulation
of political activity more likely to pose a threat to first amendment
rights.
2. Equalization of Citizen Political Influence: An Overriding
Governmental Interest?
It has been ably argued that there is a protected right to spend one's
private money without restriction for political purposes."' One must
ask, however, how such a right can conceivably coexist side by side with
the Court's repeated affirmation of a diametrically opposite right-the
right of citizens to be free of wealth distinctions in acting, and being
acted upon, in the political process.370 Moreover, those same opinions
imply an affirmative obligation to reduce or eliminate wealth-derived
influence in political campaigns . 7 If there is such an affirmative obli-
gation to reduce or prevent the impact of money in politics, how can
there simultaneously be a right to use one's money freely in politics?
Thus, in theory,3: 1 and on the basis of more than enough practical
'See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, ch.7.
See Winter, supra note 354.
:'Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
1'See text accompanying notes 78-92 supra.
12J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225-26 (1971).
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reasons, :7: a legal right to act politically by means of one's material
wealth cannot be seriously maintained.
Furthermore, even if there were such a right, like all the other first
amendment primary rights from which it derives-speech and associa-
tion-it is not absolute. Only last term, in United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,3 74 the Court,
in reaffirming the constitutionality of the Hatch Act prohibition on
political activities by public employees, stated that "[n]either the right
to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute
in any event.'':175 The survival and indeed the increased utilization of
expenditure limitations, contribution limitations, and bans on certain
organizational gifts, buttress further the conception of such a right as
clearly subject to governmental limiting. Moreover, that the overwhelm-
ing consensus of legal scholars supports the constitutionality of such
limitations on political activity:76 gives added weight to the interpreta-
tion of such a right as non-absolute in nature. The fact that no federal
court has ever invalidated any campaign-constraining legislation surely
suggests general acceptance of the overriding need for limiting the use
of personal wealth in elections. So does the long line of cases sustaining
a variety of constraints on political activity.3 7 In one of those cases,
now nearly a hundred years old, the Court gave its rationale:
If the government of the United States has within its constitutional
domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very sources
of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and
outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the country in danger,
and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires,
and the love which enshrines it, are at the mercy of the combinations
of those who respect no right but brute force, on the one hand, and
unprincipled corruptionists on the other."'
Indeed, the kind of over-riding interest present here is of the same
nature as those involved in the few cases in which courts have sustained
admitted burdens on first amendment rights, 7 and is, if anything, of
"See FLEISHMAN, supra note 4, chs. 1-2.
-'93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
'111d. at 2891.
"'See articles cited notes 345 & 365 supra.
"WSee cases cited and discussed in Fleishman, supra note 27, at 417, 421-22, 434-38, 444-46.
"'"E parte Yarbrough, I10 U.S. 651, 667 (1884).
3'Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961): see Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
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even greater weight.
Finally, whatever the scope of any right to the free use of personal
wealth in elections-and this analysis suggests that it is infinitely limita-
ble by legislation-that right could certainly be voluntarily waived by
the candidate in return for the subsidy. While such a waiver would not
extend to third party actors, it would remove any doubt as to the viola-
tion of any rights of the candidate himself, or rights of' his supporters
operating under his direction.
The theory underlying reliance on voluntary waiver is that if the
subsidy were one hundred percent of what candidates could legally
spend, it would be difficult for any-candidate to refuse it. In the unlikely
event that one did, thereby opting for one hundred percent private fi-
nancing and no limits, he would be at a tremendous political disadvan-
tage, subjecting himself to charges by his opponents of being a willing
creature of vested interests.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act includes such a
waiver, in effect, in the form of requiring as a prerequisite to receiving
any subsidy payment an agreement to limit campaign expenditures to
the levels established in the Act..3 10 The trouble with a voluntary waiver
is that it leaves the private financing option open to those candidates
who wish to escape whatever limitations are imposed, and there has
already been at least one statement from the Republican National Com-
mittee that if the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act had been
in effect for the 1972 Elections, the Republican party would have re-
fused the subsidy rather than abide by the limits. 31 1
A better use of waiver would be to compel it, even if that makes a
fiction of the notion. Federal law already provides for coercing criminal
testimony if immunity from prosecution is granted, :"' thus avoiding the
fifth amendment's rule against self-incrimination. It might be possible
to require candidates for federal office to accept public subsidy and to
refuse any private contributions. The recent Letter Carriers case:"'
holds that government may condition employment on a citizen's willing-
ness to waive his right to participate in partisan political management,
on the theory that the unrestrained exercise of that right by a govern-
I9NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9003(b).
' 'See N. Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1971, at 15, col. I (late city ed.).
'2See Annot., 32 L. Ed. 2d 869 (1973).
- 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973). The case was significant mainly because it was decided contrary to
a trend or evolving Court theory over the past twenty-five years. See Fleishman, supra note 27, at
437, 444.
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mental employee reduces the likelihood that he will be able to perform
impartially in his employment. This would suggest that the government
might also condition acceptance of the subsidy, and perhaps eligibility
for federal candidacy itself, on waiver of any right to accept private
contributions. So long as the public money payment is reasonable in size
and is to be used in place of private money, the clear intent of preventing
purchased partiality would seem to justify the constraint and the com-
pelled waiver. The waiver rationale, however, is not very convincing,
and, because the evidence against the existence of any right to spend
one's money freely in political activity is so strong anyway, waiver really
isn't needed.
3. Public Subsidy: The Least Onerous Alternative
In assessing the first amendment infringements, the Court would
weigh the means chosen against all other reasonably available means in
order to be certain that it is the least onerous alternative. 84 As sug-
gested elsewhere,8 5 public subsidy is inherently the most effective and
least burdensome mode of achieving integrity in the election process.
It is far more effective than contribution and expenditure limita-
tions alone, in that it directly addresses and eliminates the problems of
candidate deterrence, campaign contribution-purchased private influ-
ence on public policies, and the differential advantage available to
wealthy or wealth-backed candidates in elections. Expenditure limita-
tions attempt to achieve these goals indirectly-by keeping down the
total cost of elections, while contribution limitations address only the
second and third problems, and then only half-heartedly. Moreover,
contribution and expenditure limitations can only control the flow of
funds to those who are already attracting them; they do nothing for
minor parties, minorities, and dissidents. Subsidy goes directly to the
heart of these matters, and it is the only mode of campaign regulation
which does.
It frees all citizens from financial constraints on the opportunity to
seek public office, and thereby severs the dependency of candidates on
the policy preferences and personal interests of existing sources of
wealth. It promises to give political opportunity to all shades of political
opinion, without unduly unsettling the stability and orderly change
"'United States v. Robe], 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960). Comment, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
- See Fleishman, supra note 27, at 479.
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which characterize centrist democracies, such as ours.
While public subsidy is inherently the least onerous alternative, its
constitutionality would certainly be affected by particular components
of the plan. Of special worry are the provisions dealing with third party
actors. By no theory can their political activity be constitutionally
banned, or can they be prohibited from using a particular candidate's
name in election advertising. Nor does it seem feasible to devise a mode
of public subsidization of their activities.
A limitation on the amount which they might spend, if it were of
reasonable size so that it gave their voice the opportunity to be heard,
would appear constitutional, but there are absolutely no guidelines
available as to reasonableness.
One conceivable answer, at least, would seem to lie in requiring the
financing of all political activities of such groups to be administered
through a federal election agency. This seems perfectly constitutional,
as well as a satisfactory way of dealing with what is, after all, only a
minor portion of election activity. Because the exclusion of private
money from major party races might tend to encourage it to flow
through such committees into the campaign, a reasonable expenditure
limitation would seem to be permissible.
A criterion is available here, too. The legislation could define com-
mittees subject to such administration in much the same way as the
Federal Election Campaign Act does, as any committee undertaking
activity "for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or
election, of any person to Federal office. '36 Thus, any actor who pub-
lishes leaflets or purchases advertisements using a candidate's name or
picture, or unmistakably referring to him, could be required to place
the funds to purchase such publicity in a deposit account in the federal
election agency and have the agency pay the printer or publisher by
check.
So long as third party actors do not campaign for a particular
candidate, they should be free to spend money directly for publicity,
arguing their interest publicly. That right would seem clearly and pro-
perly immune from restriction, although there is some language in the
cases which suggest that registration of such efforts might properly be
required by Congress. 37
One of the arguments used by opponents of total public subsidy is
"'Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 201, 86 Stat. 3 (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 591(f), (d) (Supp. 1973)).
"'E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
[Vol. 52
CITIZEN POLITICAL INFLUENCE
that such plans inevitably benefit candidates with wide support among
people with time, such as students and labor union members, to the
detriment of those candidates whose supporters have more money than
time.3 18 The assumption is probably specious because citizens with
higher incomes have much more discretion in the use of their time
during the working day than do labor union members, for example. But
even if it were valid, there is a great deal to be said for requiring
participation in politics to be through a common currency available to
all citizens-time. If the wealthy were put on the same footing as the
poor, and were forced to donate time in order to be politically effective,
the benefit to the society would be immense, not only because of the
added personal participation, but also because society would be rid of
the corrosive practice of buying oneself out of a civic responsibility by
the payment of money. In any event, if one must choose between giving
an advantage to wealth on the one hand and to numbers on the other, a
democracy can, in conscience, choose only the latter.
Finally, to whatever extent the ban on private money discriminates
against the rich, it is more than justified by the new freedom of speech
and association it gives to the poor for the first time.
4. Public Subsidy: No Greater Conceivable Overriding Interest
The last decade has made ever clearer the determination of the
Court to insure that political opportunity and influence are allocated
equally among all our citizens. Any reasonable legislative policies which
breathe reality into that opportunity, and which diminish inequalities in
the exercise of political influence, serve vital constitutional goals, re-
peatedly sanctioned by the Court.
The attainment of those goals depends primarily on eliminating the
use of privately donated money in campaigns. In no other way can
government be opened to participation by all segments of the popula-
tion, giving talented poor people for the first time a genuine chance to
compete for office. In no other way can public policy-making be insu-
lated from skewing by private interest. In no other way can the electoral
balances be immunized from the effects of differential wealth distribu-
tion in the society as a whole.
Any resource as unevenly distributed as wealth has no place in the
political arena. While individual characteristics of candidates-
"'See Winter, supra note 354.
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intelligence, charisma, energy, integrity, dedication, and vision-
cannot be equalized in the competition for public office, wealth can!
Political opportunity in a democracy must depend on citizens' indi-
viduality rather than on their material possessions. Indeed, the realiza-
tion of political democracy rests finally on as complete a divorce as
possible between personal wealth and political influence.
E. CONCLUSION
Public subsidization of elections constitutes an attempt to ensure
that the rights guaranteed in the first amendment are distributed equally
among the people, as required by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
That it has taken us two centuries to perceive the flaw in our system
of political financing is shameful, but not nearly as shameful as it would
be to ignore that flaw now that Watergate has raised it to consciousness.
What is at stake is citizen confidence and trust in our government, citi-
zen participation in effecting government by the people, in other words
the republic itself. To save the republic requires a bold departure from
the ways of the past. More of the same can result only in a continuation
of shameful elections and untrusted government. Is that the way we wish
to enter our third century of a nationhood?
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